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ABSTRACT 
PRIORITIZING OFFENDERS: AN EVALUATION OF THE CHARLOTTE-
MECKLENBURG POLICE DEPARTMENT P.O.S.T. PROGRAM. (December 2011) 
Den·ick Wesley Lail, B.A, Appalachian State University 
B.S., Appalachian State University 
M.S., Appalachian State University 
Chairperson: Elicka Peterson-Sparks, Ph.D. 
In April 2008, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department (CMPD) implemented 
an offender-driven initiative designed to identify those offenders believed to be most actively 
motivated to commit Pati I crimes against the residents of Charlotte, North Carolina. 
Through a comprehensive and collaborative effort, this approach sought to prioritize 
available resources in a manner which would hold these identified offenders accountable for 
their crimes and, ultimately, contribute to a reduction in Charlotte's persistently high PattI 
crime. This intervention is known as the Priority Offender Strategy Team (POST). The 
cun·ent study illuminated various weaknesses in the actual implementation process of the 
POST program; however, statistically significant evidence was produced which demonstrates 
the program's ability to reduce recidivism by the identified motivated offenders. The author 
concluded that the combined suppoti of existing literature and empirical findings allow the 
CMPD POST program to be considered an effective crime reduction strategy. 
lV 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
In 2010, the Bureau of Justice released statistics repotted that the United States 
exhibited the lowest propetty crime victimization since 1993. For example, the propetty 
crime victimization rate declined from 159.0 per 1,000 households in 2002 to 120.2 per 1,000 
households in 2010. Violent victimization declined 33.5 percent between 2001 and 2009. 
Despite these reductions, however, the United States maintains a persistently high rate of Part 
I crime when compared to other Western, industrialized countries. Patt I offenses are 
routinely defined as one of eight index crimes: homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated 
assault, burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft and arson (Robinson, 2009). 
Walker (20 II) wrote that, while the crimes rate disparities are narrowing, "our rates 
of violent crimes are still much higher than those of other industrialized societies (pg. 62). 
For example, in 2009, Japan's National Police Agency repmted 1.7 million penal code 
offenses known to the police. Of those documented incidents, 1.3 million were larceny 
(www.npa.go.jp/english/kokusai/19.pdf). By comparison, the United States experienced 
approximately 16.45 million reported thefts (personal theft, residential burglary, motor 
vehicle theft, theft), according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics (2009). More specifically, 
135 per 1,000 households repotted propetty crime-related victimization in 2008. In addition 
to these property offenses, roughly 19 per I ,000 persons were the victims of a violent 
offense. Walker (2011) highlighted that the American murder rate was, in the recent past, 
four times higher than Canada's and ten times higher than England's and West Germany's. 
Similarly, the robbery rate was five times higher than that of England and West Germany. 
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Like the rest of the nation, the crime rates in Charlotte, North Carolina have exhibited 
a noticeable decline (CMPD, 20 I 1; www.city-data.com/city/Charlotte-Nmih-Carolina.html). 
However, Charlotte has also maintained a persistently high overall rate compared to the 
national average. For example, Table 6 illustrates that both the overall reported violent and 
property crimes (as well as all Patt I crimes) in Charlotte declined from 2009 to 201 0 
(CMPD, 2011). However, Figure 4 demonstrates that the Charlotte burglaty rates have 
remained considerably higher than the national average (www.city-data.com/city/Charlotte-
North-Carolina.html). 
While it is clear that America is experiencing a sustained drop in crime, it is also 
evident that the current rates remain undeniably high. As these rates persist, crime reduction 
strategies continue to dominate American policy discussions (for example, Raymond and 
Menifield, 2011; Temple, 2011). Especially when considered within the context of the 
current American economic crisis, it is imperative that the elected strategy be the most 
effective and efficient option possible. 
Numerous researchers have supported one patticular strategy, which is founded on 
the proclamation that a small subset of individuals within a given population is responsible 
for a disproportionate amount of overall crime (e.g., Bhati, 2007; Shannon, McKim, Curry, 
and Haffner, 1988; Tracy, Wolfgang, and Figlio, 1985; Wolfgang, Figlio, and Sellin, 1972). 
This offender population research has even been applied to the extent that investigators have 
attempted to predict the individuals who will commit the highest frequency of offenses in the 
future (e.g., Blumstein, FatTington, and Moitra, 1985; Blumstein, 1995; Farrington and 
Tarling, 1985; Fagan and Guggenheim, 1996; Farrington, 1986; Jennings, 2006). The 
prediction instruments in these studies, however, consistently produced accuracy rates 
PRIORITIZING OFFENDERS 3 
hovering around only 50 percent, with specific concerns of false positives (Wenk, Robinson, 
and Smith, 1972). 
Though predictive efforts have not produced inspiring results, prominent scholars, 
such as Felson (2006) and Walker (20)1 ), agree that there is merit to the strategy of 
identifying and addressing the small percentage of highly motivated offenders. Such 
offender-driven efforts must then be included in a comprehensive action plan iflaw 
enforcement agencies are to effectively reduce crime within that jurisdiction. Therefore, the 
current thesis presents a description and evaluation of a strategy recently implemented by the 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Depatiment (CMPD) in Charlotte, North Carolina. 
Accepting the aforementioned research regarding motivated offenders, CMPD 
implemented an initiative known as the Priority Offender Strategy Team (POST). This 
program is designed to concisely focus depatimental resources toward increasing the level of 
supervision of and eliminating the opp01iunity for this small percentage of offenders to 
perpetrate. In doing so, CMPD intends to maintain and/or increase the decline in rep01ied 
Part I Offenses in Charlotte. 
An analysis of Charlotte's POST program is especially imp01iant in two respects. 
First, the POST program was the only program of its kind in N01ih Cat·olina at conception. 
Previously, the most closely-related program was the Repeat Offender Prosecution 
Enforcement (ROPE) project in Fayette County, Georgia, which also accepts that six percent 
of offenders commit 70 percent of crime. This program, however, focuses only on career 
criminals (http://www.lexingtonprosecutor.com/Default.htm). The second area in which an 
evaluation of the POST program is patiicularly noteworthy is that a program such as POST 
program has the potential to serve as an effective crime reduction model, especially as it is 
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grounded in both a widely accepted criminological theory and considerable research 
suggesting that such an approach would more significantly and efficiently reduce crime than 
traditional law enforcement approaches. 
The cunent evaluation will begin with a review of existing crime reduction strategy 
literature. In distinguishing between effective and ineffective attempts, theoretical support 
will be provided for the POST program. Various data will then be used to demonstrate the 
program's ability to effectively reduce recidivism by this prioritized group of motivated 
offenders, contributing to a decline in Charlotte's Part I crime rate. The assessment will be 
supplemented by exploring identified weaknesses in both the implementation of the action 
plan and the current evaluation, providing research-based recommendations when 
appropriate. 
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE 
Ineffective Strategies 
Before a determination can be made regarding the effectiveness of the cunent 
program, a discussion is necessary regarding the additional array of police strategies often 
employed in an eff01t to control crime trends. When proposing a crime reduction strategy, it 
is imp01tant to ensure that the recommendation consider the conclusions of empirical 
research regarding what practices do and do not effectively influence crime. As Walker 
(2011) stated, the criminal justice system is "overloaded by bad policies" (pg. 53). It is the 
responsibility of the policymakers to acknowledge and leam from the research regarding 
these bad policies. 
Preventative Patrol 
Since the 1800s, routine police patrol has epitomized the most common crime 
reduction strategy employed by law enforcement (Walker, 2011). The idea is simple: a 
visible police presence deters crime (Sherman, 1997). If accepting this logic at face value, it 
would stand to reason that increasing visibility would produce a decline in crime within that 
patticular area. Despite the popularity, however, visible patrol as a form of effective 
deterrence was discredited by Kelling, Pate, Diekman and Brown (1974) in the celebrated 
Kansas City Preventative Patrol Experiment (KCPPE). 
The authors of the KCPPE divided a patrol district into individual beats. The 
proactive beat consisted of a multi-time increase in the level of patrol. The reactive beat did 
not patrol, simply responding to calls for service. The control beat maintained n01mal patrol 
levels. Through a victimization survey, the authors concluded that an increase in 
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preventative patrol had no impact on crime or the fear of crime. Fmihermore, crime did not 
increase in beats that operated on reactive patrol, alone (Kelling et al., 1974). 
In a similar project initiated in Newark, New Jersey for The Police Foundation, 
Kelling, Pate, Ferrara, Utne, and Brown (1981) conducted an experiment in order to 
detetmine the impact foot patrol exhibited on crime in a given area. By matching eight 
similar beats, the authors discontinued foot patrol in four of the beats for nearly one year. As 
with the KCPPE, the authors surmised that foot patrol had no impact on the crime rates. To 
its credit, however, increased levels of foot patrol were associated with an increase in 
citizens' perception of safety within the area. 
In a more contemporary publication, Felson (2006) also argued that even the most 
supervised location/person can quickly and easily become the next victim of a motivated 
offender. 
"A thorough burglary requires a higher level of abandonment, but most burglaries 
take five minutes or less ... To catTy out a quick but noisy crime, an offender needs 
little time but enough space to buffer the sight and sounds. When supervision is low 
enough, a greater variety and number of offenses can be easily carried out" (pg. 84). 
For this reason, Felson concluded that the traditional methods of patrol are inadequate to 
effectively control crime. 
Despite these findings, preventative patrol persists as a popular law enforcement 
strategy (Walker, 2011). Therefore, Eck and Maquire (2000) conducted a meta-analysis of 
27 studies related to the impact the number of police exhibit on crime. The authors found 
that 20 percent of the reviewed studies attributed lower crime rates to an increase in police. 
Eck and Maquire, however, also noted that 30 percent found that more police actually 
resulted in an increased crime rate. These mixed results are of particular concem in the 
search for an effective crime reduction model, when applied to the findings of a study by 
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Zhao, Scheider, and Thurman (2002). Specifically related to grants to increase the number of 
law enforcement on the streets, the authors reported that one dollar in grant money per city 
resident yielded a 5.26 decline in violent crimes per 100,000 people. However, as Walker 
(2011) illustrated using Omaha, Nebraska, this decline comes at a cost of nearly $19,400 per 
violent crime prevented. This example of ineffectiveness is consistent with a 1978 
publication by Kenneth Chelst, which estimated 1 percent of crimes to be intercepted in 
progress at a price tag of $2 billion annually in preventative patrol. 
Even the push for faster response times has proven to be a futile strategy in the effort 
to reduce repmied Part I crime (Walker, 2011 ). Spelman and Brown (1984) emphatically 
stated that rapid police response to a reported Part I crime facilitated an arrest in only three 
percent of the reviewed instances. The authors attributed this dismal outcome to the reality 
that only approximately 30 percent of all calls for service involve criminal activity. Walker 
(20 11) provided an estimate as low as 17 percent. Thus, a quicker response offers little 
benefit. 
Reliance on Detectives 
With the front line of defense exhibiting little impact on crime rates, a logical 
intuitive progression is to redirect reliance onto the detectives tasked with investigating the 
remaining 99 percent of reported incidents not intercepted during the commission (Chelst, 
1978). Especially as primetime television shows, such as CSI: Miami, sensationalize the 
Sherlock Holmes-esque ease and efficiency with which super sleuths identify and apprehend 
offenders (Robinson, 2011 ), society's perception of the role of detectives in reducing crime is 
skewed by myths (Walker, 2011 ). Of greater concem, however, is the potential for these 
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misperceptions to manifest in the decisions and policy implementations of department 
administrators, the court system and lawmakers. 
According to the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation's (2011) annual Uniform Crime 
Reporting handbook (UCR), nearly 50 percent of rep01ted violent incidents are cleared by 
arrest or exceptional means. This is not surprising upon considering that more than half of 
rep01ted violent incidents involve a suspect who is known by the victim/rep01ting person 
(Bureau of Justice, 2011 ). However, less than 20 percent of property crimes are cleared by 
arrest or exceptional means (Federal Bureau oflnvestigation, 2011 ). The UCR author did 
not even note a percentage of propetty crime committed by a stranger. More concerning is 
that the UCR reported that the 20 percent national clearance rate is slightly inflated by a 21.1 
percent clearance rate for larceny; burglaries and auto thefts each maintain just above the ten 
percent mark (12.4 burglary, 11.8 auto theft). 
As previously stated, nearly 14.8 million property crimes were rep01ted in 2010 
(Federal Bureau oflnvestigation, 2011). This total is a gross representation of the caseloads 
assigned to individual detectives within a given jurisdiction. Therefore, it was but an 
affirmation to review Walker's (2011) analysis of the credence in reliance on detectives as an 
effective crime reduction strategy. 
Walker (2011) explained that a typical case gets an average of about four hours' 
work, the majority of which is paperwork. Thus, the investigators must rely on someone else 
to provide the inf01mation necessary to solve the case. Spelman and Brown (1984) 
illustrated that 75 percent of crime-related calls for service are dispatched long after the 
incident actually occun·ed. Outside of a witness available and willing to provide actionable 
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, information, it is unlikely that the reporting officer will present the detective with the 
necessary lead to identify and apprehend the responsible offender. 
Another potential information source is Crimestoppers. With this system, a caller 
may provide information to law enforcement regarding a specific criminal incident in return 
for monetary reward. The caller is assigned an identification number in order to maintain 
anonymity. Gresham, Stockdale, and Batiholomew (2003) assessed the Crimestoppers 
system. The authors determined that- of the 56,555 calls documented in 2000- 9 percent 
lead to a successful outcome. The study also demonstrated that 43 percent of the successful 
outcomes (in the UK) were specific to drug offenses. Therefore, an actionable tip is unlikely 
to arise and aid the assigned investigator. 
The final source hope for investigators to identify a suspect is forensic evidence. The 
belief is that, with time and patience, a fingerprint or DNA match will provide the identity of 
the offender. Discouragingly, however, Walker (2011) rep011ed that the New York City 
police are able to obtain usable prints in approximately I 0 percent of all burglaries. When 
applied to Charlotte, for example, that equates to 10 percent of 30,221 burglaries in the past 3 
years (see Table 7). Similarly, DNA evidence was "remarkably successful" by providing an 
identity match to reported prope11y crimes in only I percent of the 295,865 samples collected 
in Virginia as of2009 (DNA initiative). 
Three-Strikes Laws 
With the awareness that law enforcement actions like preventative patrol and reliance 
on detectives exhibit little impact on crime, the wishful expectation exists that the worst 
offenders will eventually be anested and be incapacitated under available sentence 
enhancements. As Kathleen Auerhahn (2002) wrote, "In recent years, there has been an 
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increased emphasis on particularistic types of sentencing reform- reforms that promise to 
target and incapacitate cettain types of individuals" (p. 354). Nearly every state in America 
now utilizes some form of sentence enhancements once an offender receives three 
consecutive felony convictions. These three strikes laws, however, contain numerous 
weaknesses in the attempt to reduce offending by motivated offenders. 
First, habitual offender enhancements have exhibited mixed results at best (Auerhahn, 
2002; Jones and Newbern, 2006; Kovandzic, 200 I). Second, habitual offenders who receive 
sentence enhancements often have aged out of the peak criminal offending years (Adler, 
Mueller, and Laufer, 2001; Kovandzic, 2001; Stolzenberg and D'Alessio, 1997). Blumstein 
(1995) described how the frequency with which offenders commit various propetty and 
violent crimes begins to spike around age 15, peaking near age 17. Property crime begins to 
diminish after age 21; violent crime frequency slows after age 24. Yet, third-strike offenders 
who receive enhancements are an average of 36 years of age (Auerhahn, 2002). 
Last, the likelihood of reoffending is negatively conelated to the length of time 
between incidents. A report by the Bureau of Justice (2002) documented that I 0.6 percent of 
prisoners released in 1994 were convicted of new charges within six months; this number 
doubled after one year of being released. Kurlycheck, Brame, and Bushway (2006) 
suppotted these findings, also describing the potential for reoffending to be greatest during 
the first six months following a previous contact. Habitual offender laws often attach to 
convictions obtained throughout the course of numerous years. While sentence 
enhancements could be helpful in incapacitating career criminals such as Richard Allen 
Davis, who abducted and murdered 12-year-old Polly Klaas in October 1993 (Auerhahn, 
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2002), the benefits appear to provide little assistance in the mission to target actively 
motivated offenders. 
Summary 
If a proposed project, program or policy is to be an effective crime reduction strategy, 
it must consider previous attempts which have been proven ineffective. Scholars have 
clearly demonstrated that traditional strategies of unleashing patrol and increasing detectives 
have little impact on the clearance of reported property crimes. In addition, the reliance on 
sentence enhancement to incapacitate chronic offenders appears to be similarly ineffective. 
Walker (2011) concluded that "(t)he key to solving crimes and making anests, in sh01t, is 
iriformation about a specific suspect" (pg. 108, original emphasis), and that "(f)ingerprints, 
blood samples, and hair specimens are not what solve most cases. Inf01mation about a 
suspect does" (pg. 11 0). This author maintains that intervention eff01ts must begin with this 
asse1tion. 
Effective Strategies 
As identified ineffective strategies are acknowledged and discarded from the design 
of a new crime reduction initiative, consideration must also be given to those efforts which 
are supported by empirical research. Rather than the "intuitively appealing tactics of 
preventative patrol and rapid response" (Kappeler, 2006, pg.l4), a successful anti-crime 
eff01t should approach a defined problem by incorporating beneficial aspects from models 
already evaluated and affi1med in existing literature. Discussed below are three tactics that 
have been awarded such support. While the below approaches may not be policing 
strategies, per se, a later discussion will describe how each is included in the CMPD POST 
program offender-driven initiative. 
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Identifying Motivated Offenders 
In 1972, Marvin Wolfgang, Figlio, and Sellin provided a landmark study, which 
suggested that an identifiably small number of individuals within a population are 
responsible for a majority of reported offenses. The study collected delinquency records 
from a cohott of males born in 1945, ages 10-18, who had resided in Philadelphia throughout 
the duration of their lives. By comparing 3,475 males, Wolfgang concluded that 6.3 percent 
of the population was responsible for 52 percent of the repotted offenses. In an effort to 
confirm the original findings, Wolfgang and associates initiated a replication study (Tracy, 
Wolfgang and Figlio, 1985). The replication compared records of28,338 males hom in 
Philadelphia in 1958. The study concluded, similarly, that 7.5 percent of the cohort 
represented the motivated offenders. 
To demonstrate that a small group of offenders exist beyond the sample of 
Philadelphia, Shannon, McKim, Cuny, and Haffner (1988) published a study including three 
cohorts in Racine, Wisconsin. The cohort consisted of6,127 patticipants born in 1942, 1949 
and 1955. Similar to Wolfgang, this study found that, across three separate populations, an 
average of7.8 percent of the cohott was responsible for a majority of the repotted offenses. 
This is of particular interest since the cohott contained only an 11 percent minority 
population. 
From a law enforcement policy perspective, there appears to be a consistent pattem in 
which a majority of reported crime can be attributed to roughly 5 to 10 percent of a 
population. Therefore, "(i)f we could successfully identify and effectively respond to that 6 
percent, we could achieve a major reduction in serious crime" (Walker, 2011, pg.78). First, 
as previously discussed in regards to clearance rates, the odds of arresting an offender for a 
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crime (particularly a non-violent Part I offense), are only favorable if information about the 
suspect is presented to the assigned investigator. A figure from the 1967 President's 
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice Task Force Repott (in 
Walker, 2011) depicts the reality that only 12 percent of the 1375 cases repotied to the Los 
Angeles Police Department without a named suspect in 1966 were cleared. A concentration 
of resources toward this small percentage of motivated offenders should increase the amount 
of usable information about the offender and his/her close associates. 
The second benefit to identifying the highly motivated offenders is the potential for 
prevented crimes. Undeniably, much debate exists regarding the most accurate estimate of 
motivated offender crime rates or 'A (Auerhahn, 1999; Auerhalm, 2002; Bhati, 2007; 
Jennings, 2006; Marvell and Moody 1994; Piquero and Blumstein, 2007; Spelman, 1994; 
Zimring and Hawkins 1995). If nothing more, these studies consistently agree that estimates 
vary among authors and prediction mechanisms. More relevant to the current evaluation, 
however, is that a small percentage of the sample populations were found to skew the 
averages due to their high frequencies. For example, Bhati (2007) noted that "only 5 percent 
of the releasees would have committed more than five crimes" (pg. 11 ). 
Prioritizing Offenders 
Numerous scholars have detailed the reemergence of incapacitation through 
incarceration as the preferred method of crime control (Auerhahn, 1999; Auerhahn, 2002; 
Piquero and Blumstein, 2007). Incapacitation is founded in the assumption that incarcerated 
offenders will be prevented from victimizing additional members of society by being 
removed from that society (Bhati, 2007; Marvell and Moody 1994; Piquero and Blumstein, 
2007; Spelman, 1994; Zimring and Hawkins, 1995). This shift in punishment style, 
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combined with the aforementioned high crime rates, has caused the number of American 
state and federal inmates to increase from approximately 200,000 in 1973 (Bhati, 2007) to 
2.3 million in 2008 (Liptak, 2008). 
However, this method must be considered from an economic perspective. The cost 
for the 2.3 million inmates to federal, state and local governments was approximately $75 
billion in 2008 (Schmit, Warner, and Gupta, 201 0). While research such as Levitt (2004) and 
Spelman (2005) report declines of25-33 percent in crime rate attributable to incarceration 
boom in 1990s, scholars qualify that gross incarceration is an ineffective reduction method 
(Walker, 2011). Therefore, attention must be directed to the noticeable portion of these 
offenses which appear to be committed by a small percentage of offenders. 
In addition to the financial considerations, research suggests that a decrease in time 
between charge and disposition exhibits a positive impact on crime, especially with 
consideration to a small, motivated offender population. According to statistics by the 
Bureau of Justice (2007), 11 percent of defendants on pretrial release from 1990 to 2004 
were charged with a new felony. Also, eight percent of defendants were rearrested for a new 
offense within the first week of release. The report specified that those defendants on pretrial 
release, probation or parole at the time of the current atTest/release were more likely to be 
rearrested (failure to appear or new offense). Walker (2011) recommended speedy 
disposition as a solution. Acknowledging that this practice has been enacted in many states 
but often avoided, Walker proposed that dispositions should be expedited "for only those 
offenders who are high risks" (pg. 154). 
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Evidence-Based Interventions 
The final review of effective crime reduction strategies relates more directly to 
planning and implementation practices. Regardless of the targeted crime trend, an agency's 
response should follow a series of steps in order to ensure that the response is the best 
solution possible (Welsh and Harris, 2008; www.popcenter.org). As Walker (20 11) wrote, 
"(E)ffective police anti-crime efforts are not a matter of simply 'more cops' or 'working 
harder, 'but of attacking crime and disorder intelligently and using an evidence-based 
approach" (pg. 94). Following discussion of evidence-based strategies, an example of a 
successfully planned intervention will be provided, completing the literary review serving as 
the foundation for the current evaluation of the CMPD POST program. 
Planned versus unplanned change. Welsh and Harris (2008) began their policy and 
planning guideline by calling immediate attention to a similarity among the numerous 
ineffective responses to identified crime trends. "The problem is that many criminal justice 
interventions fall short of their goals because of poor planning, poor implementation, and 
poor evaluation" (pg. 2). Unplanned change is characterized by reactionary responses to 
major incidents or issues perpetuated by politics or the media. These reactions often lack 
significant proactive planning and typically include strategies that are more intuitive or faith-
based than research-based. Welsh and Hanis (2008) called unplanned implementations 
"wasteful of valuable public resources" (pg. 3). Conversely, planned change consists of 
crime trend interventions deriving from evidence analyses and proactive planning. 
Drawing on research by Goldstein's Problem-Oriented Policing 
(www.popcenter.org), Walker's (2011) assessment of effective and ineffective crime 
reduction strategies and Welsh and Han·is' (2008) planning and policy guide, the explanation 
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of planned change can be summarized into five characteristics. First, planned change should 
be limited in scope. By focusing on precise problems, proposed solutions can be evaluated 
by clear, concise goals and objectives. Second, planned change often includes a role for 
consumers. Who has an interest at stake? The scholars concur that an effective strategy 
would emphasize inclusive partnerships between law enforcement and the residents, business 
owners, customers, etc., in an effort to promote sustainability. Third, planned change 
exhibits accountability. Welsh and Harris (2008) prescribed a designated individual 
responsible for the implementation coordination, assessment and revision of the intervention. 
However, if no single person is tasked with this responsibility, a process must be in place to 
monitor the implementation and progress of the initiative. 
The fomih characteristic of planned change is its flexibility. Many have heard the 
adage, "The only things cetiain in life are death and taxes." This humorous expression 
summarizes Felson's (2006) observation that life is capable of- and often tends to- change 
at any time. According to Felson, life is characterized by seven requirements which facilitate 
adaptation and growth. Felson took this observation and devoted an entire chapter in Crime 
and Nature to explaining, in detail, the ways in which crime is consistent to each of those 
requirements. From this explanation, Felson illustrated that criminals adapt to prevention 
strategies; therefore, implemented strategies must be dynamic. The key to flexibility is 
proper evaluation and revision (Walker, 2011; Welsh and Harris, 2008; www. popcenter.org). 
Systematic strategy implementation. Both Goldstein (www.popcenter.org) and Welsh 
and Harris (2008) have presented a process for implementing and evaluating a response to a 
crime trend. Though slight variations exist, the two models are consistent in the major steps. 
As visual examples, basic diagrams of the models are available in Figure 5. 
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First, the scholars agree with Walker (20 11) that any initiative is weakened at the 
onset if the identified problem is not properly analyzed. Careful problem identification 
provides the aforementioned narrowed focus, ultimately allowing for the statement of 
specific goals and objectives. The second critical stage is the consideration of existing 
research. Policymakers should consider what responses have been proven effective in 
similar instances, while avoiding those that have been deemed ineffective. Such 
consideration also bolsters any subsequent conclusion that the new strategy was responsible 
for a significant crime reduction. Third, the agency must meticulously monitor the actual 
implementation. This ensures that the intended process is being followed. Fourth, the 
strategy must be regularly evaluated to detetmine if the stated goals/objectives are being 
attained, while reassessing the status of the originally identified problem. From the 
evaluation outcome, revisions must be applied, if the problem is determined to still wanant 
law enforcement attention (Walker, 2011; Welsh and Harris, 2008; www.popcenter.org). 
Example of planned change. In 2009, the Merseyside Police (UK) identified a trend 
of increased thefts from person in a small geographic location. From January 1, 2009 to June 
30, 2009, the police received reports of 12 purse thefts from all-female victims averaging 74 
years of age. With an upward estimate of 60,000 tourists per day visiting the problem 
location, Merseyside Police applied the SARA Model and designed a reduction strategy 
(Fairbrother, 2010). 
First, Merseyside Police considered previous attempts and existing literature 
regarding the identified problem. They then designed a comprehensive strategy, which 
included law enforcement and victim education as a supplement to the proactive law 
enforcement efforts. The agency also made efforts to address each side of the crime triangle. 
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Finally, the initiative was evaluated. The authors repmted that incidents reported in the 
target location were reduced from 7 in 2009 to 0 in 2010. Similarly, the incidents in the 
surrounding displacement area were reduced from 4 to 2. Thus, the strategy was determined 
to be successful. 
Summmy 
Building on the existing literature regarding ineffective intervention efforts, any 
strategy that is to be considered as an effective crime reduction model must next consider and 
apply existing findings on previously effective approaches. This section provided support for 
three such methods: identifying motivated offenders, prioritizing offenders, and evidence-
based interventions. With this literary foundation, especially in light of the strong scholarly 
mandate for implementation assessment, the thesis now transitions into an evaluation of the 
CMPD POST program. The evaluation will begin with an explanation of the program, itself, 
and the various stages of implementation and growth, thus far. 
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CHAPTER 3: CMPD OFFENDER-DRIVEN INITIATIVE 
As of July 2009, Charlotte, North Carolina had an estimated population of709, 441 
residing within the 242.3 square miles. The racial composition of the population at the time 
of the snapshot was 47.9 percent white, followed by 32.7 percent black. The median resident 
age was 32.7. The median household income was $49,779 (www.city-
data.com/city/Charlotte-Nmih-Carolina.html). 
Charlotte has enjoyed declines in Part I crime rates consistent with the national trend. 
The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Depatiment repmied that total Part I crime declined II 
percent (41,916 to 38,297, respectively) from 2009 to 2010 (CMPD, 2011). However, as of 
2009, the Pmi I crime rate in Charlotte was 589.2 per 100,000 residents, compared to the 
national average of 320.9 per 100,000 residents (www.city-data.com/city/Charlotte-Notih-
Carolina.html). 
As pmi of an effmi in early 2008 to identify the cause for rates persistently above the 
national average, CMPD drew attention to the fact that cetiain individuals continued to be 
named as suspects in Pali I offenses. For example, the CMPD internal reporting 
management system documented that one individual was arrested, in the shmi span of28 
months, on 15 occasions for 20 separate offenses (II of which were Part I offenses). The 
final two offenses before this individual received active incarceration were armed robberies. 
However, with the exception of rarely applicable and rarely employed habitual felon 
sentencing enhancements, CMPD had no established means of addressing this defined 
problem. 
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Led by the CMPD Field Services chain of command, the push began to dete1mine an 
effective response to the crime rates. Field Services is comprised of 13 patrol divisions, 
each of which is further divided into beats or response areas. Each division also utilizes 
various non-investigative support groups, such as Focus Mission Teams, traffic enforcement 
officers and alcoholic beverage enforcement officers. Therefore, CMPD already had 
measures in place to address the crime triangle from the perspectives of the oppmiunity for 
crime and potential victims (Felson, 2006; www.popcenter.org). For example, through 
monthly CompStat, a mapping system provides department leaders with detailed information 
regarding non-offender-specific crime trends (Henry, 2002), allowing for the appropriate 
redirection or reallocation of Field Services' resources. However, the Field Services chain of 
command acknowledged the aforementioned lack of control for the third side of the triangle, 
those individuals who exhibit a persistently high motivation to offend. 
Chronic Offender Prioritization Project 
The CMPD offender prioritization initiative was implemented in April 2008 as the 
Chronic Offender Prioritization project (COP). COP sought to aggressively focus the 
depmiment's effmis on the offenders believed to be responsible for a significant portion of 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg's repmied Pmi I incidents. The project stated three goals: to identify 
Charlotte's chronic offenders, to hold these offenders accountable for their criminal actions, 
and, ultimately, to reduce Charlotte's Pmi I crime rates. 
To satisfy the first task of identifying those most prolific offenders, nominations for 
the first list were provided to the COP Executive Staff by each of the 13 patrol divisions. 
This nomination method remains the standard presently, as the founders strongly believe that 
actionable intelligence regarding active offenders originates in patrol. Upon nomination, 
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data is collect for eight influential factors. Each factor is assigned a weight that was 
implemented by COP and accepted by CMPD (see Table 8). The offenders were then 
numerically ranked. The decision to accept an individual as a COP project "chronic 
offender" was made by the Executive Staff upon combined consideration of the divisions' 
information regarding the offender's impact on that division, the types of offenses attributed 
to the offender, and the numerical ranking. 
Regarding the next goal of holding the chronic offenders accountable for their crimes, 
the COP project accepted the assertion that incapacitation through incarceration (Levitt, 
2004; Spelman, 2005) was the most effective method. Thus; the founders established a 
partnership network designed to emphasize the development of solid felony cases, with the 
intent to prioritize the identified offenders, facilitating higher conviction rates and a greater 
likelihood of incarceration upon conviction. From its original inception, the COP project 
tapped resources from all throughout the depmiment. Each centralized investigative unit was 
advised of the project and its expectations of that unit when a project offender was involved. 
Understanding that incarceration is not the only incapacitation option available, COP 
networked with the CMPD Electronic Monitoring unit, who endorsed the notion of 
emphasized requests for and attention to the monitoring of prioritized offenders. The CMPD 
Police Attorneys' Office also nominated a representative to provide legal input to the COP 
project and to review felony cases against COP offenders. 
In addition to CMPD representatives, the COP project also included pmiicipants from 
various pminering agencies, in an effort to create the most comprehensive and inclusive 
implementation possible. The Mecklenburg County District Attorney's Office designated a 
single Assistant District Attorney from the propetiy offense (burglary, larceny-theft, motor 
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vehicle theft) prosecution team and the persons offense (homicide, robbery, aggravated 
assault, select firemms-related charges) prosecution team. The North Carolina Department 
of Community Corrections agreed to prioritize and closely monitor the behavior of COP 
offenders serving active probation sentences in Mecklenburg County. 
Once an individual was designated as a COP offender, the individual was assigned for 
supervision and bi-weekly evaluation by the COP Executive Staff. Most often, the division 
which submitted the nomination was assigned the offender; however, in the rare instances 
when an offender clearly impacted an area other than the division submitting the nomination, 
the offender was assigned to the impacted division. The initial project did not require 
specific division representatives to be tasked by the Executive Staff with the offenders' 
status. Rather, monitoring strategies were left to the discretion of division leadership, with 
accountability ultimately falling upon that supervisor. However, with the emphasis on 
proactive enforcement and meticulous investigation management, it quickly became common 
practice for divisions to designate consistent, non-supervisory representatives to the project, 
if even in a dual-function role. Therefore, many COP project case managers also served as 
community policing officers or divisional investigators, in addition to the COP 
responsibilities. 
The COP project provided a protocol for CMPD employees, which applied not at the 
point of anest, but from the moment in each investigation in which probable cause to file 
criminal charges was obtained. For example, if the involved investigator was assigned a 
case for further investigation, he/she was directed to cross-reference any named individuals 
from the incident with the COP project list. If the identified suspect was a prioritized 
offender, the investigator was instructed to present the completed case file, prior to seeking 
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wanants, to a representative from the CMPD Police Attorneys' Office for review. Following 
approval, the COP project would then suppmi the investigator obtaining warrants for the 
offender. 
Upon anesting a prioritized offender, the arresting officer was instmcted to contact 
the respective divisional COP project supervisor for notification and/or additional guidance. 
The division representative was also responsible, at this point, for determining if electronic 
monitoring should have been requested from the Magistrate. This contact also provided the 
division representative(s) with the opportunity to attempt a custodial interview of the 
offender, should such an oppotiunity have been desired. In addition, prior to custody being 
transferred to the Mecklenburg County Sheriffs Office at arrest processing, the arresting 
officer was responsible for presenting an arrest affidavit which had been reviewed and 
approved by a Sergeant and clearly highlighted that the prisoner was a CMPD "chronic 
offender." The Magistrates were then expected to consider this prioritization when 
administering monetary bonds and/or electronic monitoring orders. Per the COP Executive 
Staff, this process also applied to any CMPD officer whom may have unknowingly come in 
contact with and atTested a COP project prioritized offender. 
COP divisional representatives were expected by the Executive Staff to attend bond 
hearings for their respective chronic offenders. The purpose was to answer any potential 
question raised by the prosecutor of the Judge regarding the offender and/or the related 
incident. It has also become common practice in Mecklenburg County for the Judge to 
request input from the anesting agency regarding bond considerations. If electronic 
monitoring was not ordered by the Magistrate, then the division representative would have 
typically extended the request to the Judge during the bond hearing. Finally, as cases 
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progressed toward the prosecution stages, the Police Attorneys' Office provided one-on-one 
training for the involved officer(s) to ensure the best presentation of evidence by the 
prosecution as possible. 
Though the project clearly stated various logical goals, no operational objective was 
ever defined with which to measure the project's success in achieving those goals, especially 
the third goal of contributing to the reduction in Charlotte's Pati I crime. Collected data from 
the original Chronic Offender Prioritization project consisted of the number of new incidents 
in which the offender was named as a suspect, number of arrests, number of convictions, and 
number of documented contacts by CMPD officers. In addition, any prioritized offender 
who served more than 30 days in custody Gail or prison) was tabulated, as 30 days was the 
arbitrary operational definition of a COP Project success. The 30 day success measure was 
counted out of the asse1iion that incapacitating a prolific offender was preventing that 
offender from committing new Pati I offenses, thus reducing crime. A determination of 
"success" did not automatically remove an individual from the prioritization list; rather, each 
offender was re-evaluated upon release from custody. Therefore, when analyzing the totals, 
it is imp01iant to recognize that a single offender could have accounted for multiple project 
successes under this operational definition. 
As the COP project neared the first year of existence, the Executive Staff began to 
foresee the prospect of COP perpetuating within CMPD and, potentially, evolving into a 
crime reduction model for external agencies. Therefore, the COP Executive Staff undertook 
extraneous preliminary measures ensure legitimacy and a smooth transition. First, the 
Executive Staff affirmed the imp01iance of including several criminal justice patiners to 
ensure the most effective identification and prioritization of offenders, as well as provide the 
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respective managers with the most advantageous resource options. This comprehensive 
offender-focused program became known as the Priority Offender Strategy Team (POST) 
and consisted of representatives from CMPD, the Mecklenburg County District Attorney's 
Office, the Magistrate's Office, the Notth Carolina Department of Community Corrections, 
and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (A TF). The Executive Staff 
then administered an official Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between participating 
entities (see Appendix A). 
Next, existing research regarding similar efforts was considered (e.g., Jacoby and 
Mayer, 1989; Martin and Sherman, 1986). The applications of this research will be fmther 
discussed in the next section. Finally, the CMPD Crime Analysis Division compiled the 
available data for the Executive Staff to review. The analysts determined that, in the year of 
the COP Project's existence, 57 offenders were "successfully" incarcerated for at least 30 
days, 55 were incarcerated for at least 45 days, and 41 were incarcerated for at least 90 days. 
Of the original offenders, 40 received at least one felony conviction, and 24 received an 
average sentence of39 months (CMPD, 2011). Realizing that this data had no similar set for 
comparison, CMPD noted the offender-driven initiative's potential impact and began the 
transition to the POST program. 
The current thesis will concentrate the majority of the evaluation on CMPD's 
offender-driven initiative from April2009 to October 2011, the point when the concept 
behind COP transitioned from a temporary pilot project to one of the depmtment's primary 
crime control strategies. While the COP project was pivotal in laying the foundation for 
POST, it was lacking in several areas of the model for planned change. First, no measurable 
objectives were stated prior to the implementation of the project. Second, while productive, 
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the action plan was not directly tied to existing empirical research. Third, though an attempt 
was made, no true assessment was conducted regarding the project's success in reaching its 
goals, as the only operational definition provided (30 days incarceration= Success) was an 
invalid measure for determining if the correct offender had been selected, if the offender was 
held accountable for his/her crime(s) or if the project had contributed to a reduction in Part I 
crime. 
Priority Offender Strategy Team 
Since the corrnnencement of the COP project, the POST program has undergone 
several changes, adhering more closely to the majors steps in the models of change in Figure 
5 (Welsh and Harris, 2008; www.popcenter.org). First, COP was utilized as a tool for 
extensive problem analysis, confirming that certain individuals in Charlotte 
disproportionately contribute to the Pmi I crime rates. This analysis, combined with a review 
of some of the existing literature, altered slightly the focus of the program. Rather than 
concentrating exclusively on career criminals, POST clearly defined a "priority offender" as 
an individual whose criminal behavior significantly impacts the crime rate and/or the fear of 
crime in a community. The distinction is that POST recognized tln·ough the analysis that 
motivation may be exhibited in the fotm of a chronic offender who has been involved in 
criminal activity over a long period of time or a suspect currently involved in multiple 
offenses. Also, though POST typically denies those offenders who appear to strictly engage 
in drug crimes, the program acknowledges that highly motivated offenders are likely not 
specialists (Auerhahn, 1999; Felson, 2006). Therefore, POST nominations may officially 
include persistent propetiy and/or violent criminals. 
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Second, the program's Executive Staff utilized the POST transition to officially 
implement many of the previously informal but emphasized expectations of the original 
action plan. For example, Response Area Commanders (RAC) from each patrol division 
were tasked to be the supervisors accountable for that division's respective POST 
offender(s). Also, at least one officer from each patrol division was mandated by the 
Execl)tive Staff to serve as the case manager for that division's respective POST offender(s). 
The case manager was instructed to monitor current investigations and/or pending cases 
involving the POST offender, initiate proactive enforcement actions as necessary and be 
prepared to rep01i cases statuses and newly-obtained intelligence information in a bi-weekly 
meeting with the Executive Staff. 
Third, the prioritization process of these motivated offenders was clearly outlined in a 
memorandum and training session for program representatives. As with COP, cases with a 
POST offender as the identified suspect are presented to an attomey from the CMPD Police 
Attomey's Office for preliminary review. Upon approval, the Mecklenburg County 
Magistrate's Office and District Attomey's Office have agreed to give special consideration 
to the POST cases. This consideration is typically exhibited in the form of bond and/or pre-
trial release recommendations or in resisting the nationwide norm of dismissing mediocre 
cases early in the proceedings. Also, the CMPD Crime Laboratory prioritizes evidence 
related to POST offenders on a case-by-case basis at the request of the Executive Staff 
(pending availability due to open homicide investigations). 
The final significant program change came with the operational definition of a 
program success. Rather than the previously incorporated 30 day incarceration mark, the 
POST program increased the required incapacitation to 90 consecutive days in custody. 
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Though the possibility still exists that an offender would account for multiple successes upon 
evaluation of the data, the likelihood is - in theoty - reduced by providing a more stringent 
operational definition. Notably, however, the evolution still did not produce clearly-stated, 
measurable objectives for evaluating the effectiveness of identifying the conect offenders, 
holding those offenders accountable for their crimes or contributing to the reduction in Part I 
offenses. 
Once the logistics were in place, the POST program was unveiled to the department. 
The designated RAC and/or case managers served as the ambassadors to the Executive Staff 
and notified their respective divisions of the assigned offenders, expectations and operating 
procedures. As the program's Executive Staff perceives benefit in allowing the participants 
to e~oy ownership in the program, the representatives were not given a set method of 
dissemination to the division. Thus, some divisions utilized shift roll calls, others sent mass 
e-mails, while others posted visible paper notifications in the division offices. The 
conveyance of the program to the division was an integral step in the implementation 
process, as it introduced the division to the currently-assigned offenders, while opening the 
line of communication between the case manager (and ultimately the POST program) 
regarding future intelligence and/or additional nominees. At this point, the POST program 
began. 
Cunent State of POST 
Cunently, the POST program has been in place for 30 months. Each of the 13 patrol 
divisions has a designated case manager; three divisions utilize multiple officers as liaisons 
to the program. The program cunently has roughly 360 offenders being monitored. As of 
October 2011, 71 POST offenders are on probation. Also, 47 offenders have cml'ent orders 
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to wear an electronic monitoring ankle bracelet. Of those 47 offenders, 29 are in some form 
of custody (as of October 20, 2011), and 10 are being monitored as a condition of probation. 
106 POST offenders are in active custody (90+ days). 
POST has not accepted these statistics as a successful completion of the task, 
however. Consistent with the recommendation that crime reduction strategies be flexible and 
dynamic (Felson, 2006; Welsh and Harris, 2008), the Executive Staff considers bi-weekly 
any potential areas for growth and/or improvement. Discussions range from alterations to the 
POST offender list to adherence by case managers to the defined procedural expectations. 
An example of a proactive, dynamic response to a perceived weakness in the program is the 
fonnation of the POST TRAP team. 
POST TRAP Team 
In Febmary 2010, the POST program took another innovative measure, aimed 
specifically at the level of supervision of the motivated offenders. The Executive Staff 
recognized that the prioritization process was designed to address the offenders' 
accountability post-arrest; however, the program still appeared to be lacking in regards to 
accountability for offenses not immediately known. This realization is especially relevant 
when considering the aforementioned findings on the ineffectiveness of case detectives. 
Therefore, CMPD f01med the POST TRAP Team. This unit functions in an undercover 
capacity and serves as the operational arm of the POST program. Like POST, the officers on 
the TRAP Team are representatives from the various CMPD patrol divisions, many 
exhibiting additional depatimental roles (for example, SWAT, Civil Emergency Unit, Range 
Safety Officer). For this reason, the POST TRAP Team has grown from six officers with 
rotating supervisors to more than 14 officers and a full-time sergeant. 
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TRAP serves a major function for the POST program. TRAP offers a group of 
undercover resources dedicated to supporting division investigators with individuals 
suspected in various Pati I Offenses. This is primarily accomplished tln·ough extensive static 
and/or mobile surveillance, location and apprehension of wanted offenders, but may include 
proactive undercover operations. To maximize this support, TRAP also has tln·ee officers 
who oversee all investigations regarding the program's prioritized offenders, consisting of a 
Criminal Intelligence Officer from the Crime Analysis Division, an Electronic Monitoring 
Officer from the Crime Analysis Division, and an Index Offense investigator from the TRAP 
Team. 
To date, TRAP has provided divisional assistance for approximately 1,000 unique 
offenders, several of which have even been submitted on multiple occasions as persistent 
offenders (CMPD, 2011). It must be noted that the only data consistently collected from 
February 2010 until June 2011 reflected those individuals arrested by TRAP. This author 
made an attempt to review historical records (daily activity logs, e-mail, etc.) and document 
those individuals submitted but not atTested; however, the inf01mation is, undeniably, 
incomplete. 
The POST TRAP Team's services are pivotal in CMPD's ability to more closely 
scmtinize an offender's motivation level. The issue with the suggestion to maintain 
supervision of a small population of motivated offenders is the logistical difficulty of 
implementation. As previously stated, Charlotte has over 700,000 residents (www.city-
data.com/city/Charlotte-North-Carolina.html), excluding those in the surrounding 
Mecklenburg metropolitan area or traveling to Charlotte from nearby cities. Applying the 
aforementioned estimates suggesting that less than ten percent of a population is responsible 
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for a majority of crime (Wolfgang, Figlio, and Sellin, 1972; Tracy, Wolfgang, and Figlio, 
1985; Shannon, McKim, CuiTy, and Haffner, 1988), CMPD should attempt to constantly 
supervise between 36,571 and 73,142 individuals. With only approximately 2,000 total 
sworn law enforcement officials, a steady daily flow of citizen-initiated calls for service and 
nationwide budget constraints, motivated offenders enjoy a high likelihood of escaping 
handler supervision. Under the operational philosophies of the POST program, TRAP is able 
to better provide investigators with the necessary suspect information to be able to clear 
reported incidents. In doing so, TRAP also aids in identifying more highly motivated 
offenders. 
Increasing Supervision 
Increasing the supervision of motivated offenders is a strategy strongly suppmied by 
scholarly research. While many popular theories seek to explain why an offender commits 
crime (e.g., Durkheim, 1964; Hirschi, 1969; Messner and Rosenfeld, 2007), an explanation 
of how an offender is able to commit crime is more relevant to the focus of the POST 
program. In the original Routine Activities Themy (Cohen and Felson, 1979), the authors 
proposed that motivated offenders simply exist and are a constant in the equation of crime. 
According to the theory, supervision exists in three forms: handlers for offenders, 
guardians for potential targets and managers for specific places/settings (in Felson, 2006). 
The latter two are the more commonly employed types of supervision, for a number of 
reasons. As Felson explained, it is possible for a person to simultaneously serve as a target 
guardian and a place manager. An ale1i store clerk may effectively supervise the gas station 
and the consumable goods within, for example. In addition, situational target-hardening 
techniques are heavily incorporated into daily law enforcement tactics. For example, beat 
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officers are encouraged to serve as guardians by patrolling neighborhoods and/or businesses 
which report higher crime totals, increasing supervision and making a potential target more 
difficult to victimize. 
While these supervision techniques are suppmied by Felson (2006), they overlook a 
clear recommendation. Felson wrote that, before a motivated offender can find a suitable 
target or an unsecured setting, he/she must first escape a handler's supervision. Without 
supervision, motivated offenders can maneuver anonymously through daily life. As he refers 
to classical sociological theories, Felson explained that anonymity facilitates crime and urges 
handlers to reduce the motivated offenders' ability to remain anonymous. Specifically, 
Felson wrote that "familiarity strengthens whoever is in the stronger position" (p. 91). 
Acknowledging that a motivated offender will possess a degree of familiarity with the crime 
to be committed - and likely the individual/location to be victimized - the handler must hold 
a higher level of familiarity with the offender. 
In addition, Felson (2006) stated that offenders are not generalists, as exemplified by 
the atTest record of the aforementioned unnamed offender. Felson posited that "although it is 
impractical for one person to commit all types of crime or to attack all targets, it is even less 
practical to limit oneself to a single crime specialty" (p. 235). Comparing offenders to 
omnivorous North American bears, he explained that a beneficial practice for the motivated 
offender is to utilize a variety of crime techniques, rather than relying on a single specialty. 
Felson referred this practice as foraging. 
As a bear in search offood, the non-specificity offm·aging allows offenders to 
reserve the actual crime commission for the moment when the offender feels is optimal for 
success. Referring again to the strength of anonymity and familiarity, a motivated offender 
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will search for items which satisfy Felson's (2006) CRAVED acronym (concealable, 
removable, available, valuable, enjoyable, disposable). With this ability to forage, the 
offender can decide to steal an item that facilitates a successful commission and escape, 
instead of settling for a bulky and/or worthless booty. Similarly, foraging may allow the 
offender to victimize an area with which he/she is intimately familiar, rather than risking an 
unforeseen obstacle or danger. Both of these benefits serve to maintain the offender's 
anonymity. 
While versatile foraging is the greatest resource for the motivated offender, the 
restriction of movement is the greatest limitation (Felson, 2006). However, due to the recent 
ability to dedicate full-time effmts to surveillance of the submitted offenders, TRAP has 
actually observed offenders during the connnission of offenses. When visual surveillance is 
not employed, TRAP makes an effort to utilize various electronic monitoring devices. This 
form of supervision allows for retroactive investigation into an individual's involvement in 
repmted incidents. 
In addition to the physical movement limitations, PdST also impacts foraging 
through more abstract methods. When an offender is determined to be an active offender 
wmthy of increased supervision, his/ber DNA, finger prints and photograph are all lawfully 
obtained and entered into the appropriate databases. This is impmtant because offenders who 
forage- especially regarding propetty crime- will often commit crimes while completely 
avoiding being observed by witnesses. It is much more difficult, however, to avoid leaving 
forensic evidence behind. For example, an offender may escape handler supervision, even 
momentarily, and break into a line of unguarded vehicles in a parking lot. Without proper 
supervision, this type of offense is likely to go unsolved. However, by ensuring that the 
PRIORITIZING OFFENDERS 34 
aforementioned identifiers are properly entered, the increased potential for a forensic match 
aids in addressing foraging. 
Summary 
In 2008, CMPD recognized that Charlotte's Pmi I crime rate was persistently above 
the national average and that the depmiment' s best interventions ignored the existence of a 
small percentage of the population who commit a significant portion of the rep01ied crime. 
By initiating the Chronic Offender Prioritization project, CMPD took the first step toward 
remedying that dismissal. After one year, CMPD used COP to affirm the need to prioritize 
individual offenders and- applying empirical research- implemented the Priority Offender 
Strategy Team program. 
POST has gone to great lengths to legitimize the program, from solidifying 
operational protocols to creating the POST TRAP team. The various aspects of the program 
appear to address the weaknesses in the aforementioned ineffective traditional crime 
reduction strategies, while including each of the research-supp01ied effective interventions. 
In addition to the prioritization mandate, the recent shift toward a supplemental emphasis on 
increasing the supervision of these motivated offenders bolsters the mentality to incapacitate, 
while offering a solution to Felson's (2006) issues of anonymous foraging. Last, the 
offender-driven initiatives have noticeably evolved from intuition-based ideals to research 
and evaluation-based standardized practices. 
The most glaring weakness of the POST program is that no formal evaluation has 
been conducted as POST currently operates. However, with the obvious literary supp01i, a 
favorable empirical assessment may justify POST not only being called an effective CMPD 
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strategy, but also a potential crime reduction model. The following section will provide the 
methodology employed in the cunent study to attempt such an evaluation. 
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CHAPTER 4: METHODS 
The intent of an evaluation is to make a detennination of a project/program/policy's 
ability to meet each of its stated goals. Ideally, the goals would include objectives which 
have been operationalized in a manner that would facilitate a simple calculation of the 
collected data. These objectives should also be valid measures of the effectiveness. 
CMPD clearly listed tln·ee goals. First, the POST program seeks to identify those 
individuals whose criminal behavior significantly impacts the Charlotte crime rate and/or the 
fear of crime in a community. Second, POST intends to hold these priority offenders 
accountable for their criminal actions. In doing so, POST aims to attain the third goal of 
reducing Charlotte's Part I crime rates. Currently, however, the POST program does not 
have any clearly-defined objectives to serve as a mechanism for measuring the effectiveness 
of the strategy. Therefore, for the purpose of this evaluation, an operational definition for 
each goal was created and approved by CMPD before proceeding with the analyses. It must 
be noted that the necessary preliminary step of providing inferred, operationalized objectives 
likely affected the findings for each respective goal. This will be discussed later in greater 
detail. 
For the various analyses, a data set of control offenders was generated by the CMPD 
Crime Analysis Division to be compared to the data set of POST offenders. Unless 
otherwise cited, all presented data was collected for this evaluation from the CMPD reported 
incident management system and the Administrative Office of the Courts (Mecklenburg 
County) by the CMPD Crime Analysis Division. The control offender list was produced by 
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executing a query of individuals documented as a suspect of a Part I offense within the past 
24 months of the query. The individuals produced were then s01ted in descending order by 
total number of reported incidents within the past 24 months. 
Goal! 
In order to evaluate the POST program's effectiveness in identifying the correct 
motivated offenders for prioritization, the top 100 offenders from the generated control data 
set were first cross-referenced against the POST offenders. The reasoning behind this basic 
comparison was to determine the overlap of individuals that represents the top 100 recently-
active offenders in Charlotte, with those who are actually POST offenders. It is imp01tant to 
note that suspected incidents, rather than a!1'ests, were tabulated out of an eff01t to control for 
a11'est numbers generated as a result of wa11'ants being served on an offender while he/she 
was already in custody. Also, listing an individual as a suspect in a reported Part I offense 
requires a minimum certainty level of reasonable suspicion. 
Next, based on research suggesting that offenders are most active between the ages of 
16-25 (Adler, Mueller, and Laufer, 2001; Blumstein, 1995; Kovandzic, 2001; Stolzenberg 
and D' Alessio, 1997), the original query was filtered to include the age crime curve. The top 
50 control offenders were then compared against the POST list. Arguably a more accurate 
representation of the most active offenders deserving of prioritization, the rationale was that 
the list should contain a high percentage of POST offenders. 
For a final measure of the POST program's identification of actively-motivated· 
offenders, the original control offender set was entered into the POST ranking system. The 
combined list was then s01ted in ascending order, with the first offender being the most 
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actively-motivated offender. POST offenders would be expected to heavily populate this 
exclusive grouping of motivated offenders. 
Goal2 
In order to evaluate the POST program's effectiveness in holding prioritized 
offenders accountable for their Part I offenses, a list was compiled of357 POST offenders 
since the database was created in May 2008. Next, each offender's date of acceptance to 
POST was noted. With these two pieces of information, the number of felony cases 
attributed to each POST offender after the date of acceptance to the program was determined. 
"Felony case" was operationalized as individual dates of offense. For example, 
Offender 183 (hypothetical) is charged with auto theft on 02/02/2011 and 02/27/2011 and is 
calculated as two felony cases. This definition was selected in lieu of court file numbers or 
case numbers to control for stacked felonies, originating from the same incident or a car 
break-in spree with multiple victims. The number of felony cases for each POST offender 
was then compared against the number of guilty dispositions associated with each patiicular 
case. Thus, the 02/02/2011 and 02/27/2011 example cases were (hypothetically) disposed by 
a guilty plea to the 02/27/2011 case; this would be considered two cases and one guilty 
disposition or 50 percent accountability. 
In addition to the percentage of accountability, a pre-POST to post-POST comparison 
was conducted within the same offender population. Using the initial format, the number of 
felony cases from 01/01/2005 until 05/28/2008 was gathered. The dates were selected due to 
2005 being the commencement year for the incident management system in Charlotte and 
05/28/2008 being the earliest entty date noted from the POST database. Similar to the first 
analysis from this goal, the number of guilty disposition cases was tabulated for an 
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accountability percentage. This percentage was compared against the percent of 
accountability while on POST to assess if accountability changed per prioritized offender 
upon being submitted to the program. 
The final analysis for this goal was to calculate the accountability for the control 
offenders. Any included POST offender was removed from the top 1 00 offender data set. 
The remaining 69 control offenders were reviewed fi·om May 2008 to present. The same 
definitions for "felony case" and "guilty disposition" applied. This total percentage was 
compared against the POST offender accountability percentages. 
Goal3 
Regarding the POST program's contribution to Charlotte's reduction in Part I crime 
rates, several possible methods were considered to accurately operationalize and measure the 
effectiveness of attaining the goal. The majority of existing research has focused on 
estimations of the crime rates of motivated offender (A,). However, two issues arose in the 
review of the research on A,, which made it difficult to apply measurements from those 
studies to the cunent assessment. First, the estimated average offending rates necessary to 
detennine the number of crimes prevented by incapacitation ranged from 2 to 187 offenses 
per year (Auerhahn, 1999). To reduce the risk of over (or under) stating the effect the POST 
program's incapacitation had on the identified offenders, this inconsistent estimate is· 
avoided. Second, existing research typically divides the rates into property or violent 
offenses, rather than an overall rate for a motivated generalist (Auerhahn, 1999; Felson, 
2006). Congruent with Felson, however, POST accepts highly-motivated offenders to be 
generalists. Also, the POST program seeks to contribute to Part I crime, not simply one type 
of crime or another. 
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Therefore, the assessment began with an analysis of Charlotte's Part I crime rates, in 
general, to determine if a crime reduction had occmTed. First, in the past ten years (1999-
2009), each offense category, except rape, appears to have begun a substantial decline 
between 2008 and 2009. The trend is especially appreciable with respect to property crime 
(see Table 9 from www.city-data.com/city/Charlotte-North-Carolina.html). Second, data 
provided by the CMPD Crime Analysis Division confhmed a sustained reduction in total 
PattI crimes for 2010, as well (see Table 6). 
Upon confirming an existing reduction in Charlotte's Part I crime, the number of 
program "successes" (COP = 30+ days of custody, POST= 90+ days of custody) were then 
tallied. Since POST accepts the asse1tion that selective incapacitation of highly motivated 
offenders is negatively con·elated with crime rates (Levitt, 2004; Spelman, 2005), the 
evaluation needed to determine the frequency with which POST offenders were being 
incarcerated. Therefore, the number of successes was divided by the number of POST 
offenders. 
As previously stated, the POST program also emphasizes incapacitation through 
increased supervision, consistent with the routine activities research (Cohen and Felson, 
1979; Felson, 2006), which suggests that increasing the supervision of a motivated offender 
without incarceration could still impact that offender's criminal frequency. CmTently, 71 of 
the POST offenders are on active probation/parole. Of the 357 offenders, 47 have electronic 
monitoring orders, with ten being monitored as a post-disposition condition of probation. 
However, the POST program does not currently have a process established to measure the 
impact of this emphasis. Therefore, for the purpose of the cunent evaluation, the number of 
reported Patt I "suspect" offenses for POST offenders were reviewed in an effort to 
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determine if the program's supervision impacted the individual's offending rates and, 
subsequently, Charlotte's crime rates. 
For this review, the number of offenses committed by each POST offender was 
gathered for the 12 months leading up to the offenders' respective dates of acceptance to the 
program. Likewise, the number was collected for Part I incidents committed by each POST 
offender in the 12 months following acceptance to the program. A paired t-test was then 
conducted in order to determine any statistically significant difference between the two 
groups. Data was not available for every offender for 12 months before or after acceptance 
to POST. Therefore, those offenders who had neither 12 months pre-POST nor 12 months 
post-POST were omitted from the analysis. If an offender had 12 months of data either pre-
POST or post-POST, then a zero was entered as a placeholder for that offender in the 
respective list. The final data set was officially 166 offenders. 
Finally, the CMPD Pmt I offense clearance rates from 2000 to August 2011 (see 
Figure 3 provided by CMPD Crime Analysis Division) were reviewed. The data was used to 
show that clearance rates are currently trending up. In addition, the clearance rates after the 
implementation of CMPD' s offender-driven initiative were compared to the clearance rates 
before the implementation. Though not an analysis of suspected incidents, per se, this data is 
pertinent in the respect that clearance rates are not based solely on an-ests. In the 
circumstance that an investigator has a suspect identified but is unable to pursue an an-est for 
a variety of reasons, the investigator may clear the case exceptionally. Drawing on Walker's 
(20 11) proposition that better information regarding specific offenders would increase 
clearance rates, the current analysis is applicable. 
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
CMPD clearly stated three goals for the POST program. First, POST seeks to 
identify those individuals whose criminal behavior significantly impacts the Charlotte crime 
rate and/or the fear of crime in a community. Second, the program intends to hold these 
priority offenders accountable for their criminal actions. In doing so, POST aims to attain 
the third goal of reducing Charlotte's Part I crime rates. Again, with no provided objective 
with which to measure the program's effectiveness at attaining this or any other goal, the 
cmTent evaluation created operational definitions. Various attempts were then made to 
quantify the results based on these created definitions. 
Goal! 
The first comparison was the POST list and the generated control list of motivated 
offenders. Of the top 1 00 motivated offenders, 31 percent are on the POST list. However, 
25 of the remaining 69 control offenders were in custody at the time of the analysis. The 
POST nomination procedures do not allow newly-accepted offenders to be in custody at the 
time of the submission. Therefore, it is possible that an additional percentage of these 
offenders will be nominated for POST upon release. This data is not available for analysis. 
The second comparison was the POST list and the nanowed control list, filtered by 
an age range of 16-25. Of the top 50 offenders, 60 percent (30) are on the POST list. Similar 
to the first comparison, seven of the remaining 20 control offenders were in custody at the 
time of this analysis, leaving the possibility for a higher percentage of control offenders 
being nominated to the POST list. 
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The final consideration was an analysis of the representation by POST offenders in 
the statistical ranking system, once the motivated control offenders were entered into the 
equation. As this assessment is based on two sets of selection criterion (the control query 
and the weighted ranking system), it provides the best estimate of the individuals exhibiting 
the highest documented motivation to commit Part I crime within the Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
community. Upon execution of the ranking, 26 of the top 50 priority offenders (52 percent) 
were POST offenders. Of the remaining 24 non-POST offenders, 13 were in custody at the 
time of the analysis, allowing for additional offenders to be nominated upon release. Thus, 
the POST program appears to be prioritizing a majority of Charlotte's subset of active, 
motivated offenders. 
Goal2 
The data set for this analysis consisted of 357 offenders assigned to the POST 
program. Since their respective dates of acceptance, POST offenders have been charged with 
a total of1793 felony cases in Mecklenburg County (mean= 5.01, median= 2). POST 
offenders have received a guilty disposition in 621 of the 1793 felony cases. By this 
operational definition, POST offenders were held accountable for 34.63 percent of their 
felony cases (see Figure 1). A visual review of the dispositions suggested that a vast 
majority of the cases without a guilty disposition were dismissed by the Mecklenburg County 
District Attorney's Office, rather than by a not-guilty decision. 
Upon removing the POST offenders from the original top 100 control data set, 69 
offenders remained. Since the May 2008 designated evaluation date, these control offenders 
have been charged with 981 felony cases in Mecklenburg County (mean= 14.22, median= 
3.5). Non-POST offenders have received a guilty disposition in 427 of the 981 felony cases. 
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By this operational definition, non-POST offenders were held accountable for 43.53 percent 
of their felony cases. However, with such a disparity in sample sizes between the two 
comparison groups, it is conceivable that the accountability rates of one group are not 
applicable to those of the other group. 
To ensure the applicability ofthe control data set to the POST offender data set, the 
difference in sample size was considered. The number of control offenders was 19.33 
percent that of the POST offenders. Given this percentage, it is reasonable to expectthe 
POST offenders to have been charged with 1772 felony cases, with 771 resulting in a guilty 
disposition. Thus, the actual number of POST offender felony cases ( 1793) was consistent 
with the compensation for sample size. The number of guilty dispositions for POST 
offenders, however, remained 150 convictions below the control group (19.5%). 
In an attempt to gain an understanding of the lower accountability rate for the POST 
offender, the felony cases charged to POST offenders before the implementation of the POST 
program were reviewed. Between the incorporation of the CMPD reported incident 
management system in 2005 until May 2008, the same POST offender data set was charged 
with 1884 felony cases, producing 717 guilty dispositions. Therefore, without prioritization, 
the POST offenders were held accountable for their offenses in a slightly higher percent of 
the cases (38.06) than the 34.63 percent upon assignment to the program. Several possible 
explanations exist for the lower accountability for POST offender, despite the prioritization 
goals and measure employed by the program. These explanations will be discussed later in 
the evaluation. 
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Goal3 
As described earlier, before an attempt was made to evaluate the POST program's 
effectiveness at contributing to the reduction in Part I crime, it was necessary to confirm that 
a reduction was still evident. The 1999 to 2009 summary tables available at www.city-
data.com/city/Charlotte-North-Carolina.html illustrate a clear downward trend in Charlotte's 
Part I offenses except rape (Table 9). However, this table did not provide an overall PattI 
crime rate. Therefore, for 2010, data was provided by the CMPD Crime Analysis Division 
(Table 6). This data affirmed a continued decline in Charlotte's overall Part I crime, as well. 
Also present in the data was a noticeable consistent reduction in propetty crime, specifically, 
from 2008 to present. 
Agreeing that the Charlotte crime rate is declining, especially since the time CMPD' s 
offender-driven initiative was implemented, the potential contribution of the proactive 
intervention was assessed. First, the POST program accepts the assettion that an effective 
method of reducing PattI crime is to selectively incapacitate the most active offenders 
through incarceration. The program emphasizes the development of solid felony cases, with 
the intent to facilitate higher conviction rates for the individual offenders and a greater 
likelihood of incarceration upon conviction. Therefore, the number of documented program 
"successes" was reviewed. As of the end of October 2011, the comprehensive initiative has 
accounted for 233 successes since April 2008, 36 of which were multiple periods of 
successful incarceration of the same offender (90+ days -7 release -7 90+ days). In other 
words, 55.2 percent of POST offenders have experienced at least one period of"successful" 
incapacitation. 
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Again, as no consistent estimate for the offending rates of highly motivated criminals 
(A.) was presented in the existing literature, no quantification was made for the number of 
offenses averted by the incarceration. However, in an attempt to provide an insight to the 
program's actual contribution to the declining Part I crime rates, a series ofin-depth 
comparisons regarding the repotted Part I incidents attributed to these POST offenders was 
conducted. As a base perspective, POST offenders have been suspected in an average of 
5.62 PattI offenses in Mecklenburg County within the past 24 months. Forty-two POST 
offenders have been suspected in 1 0+ felony cases in that timeframe. It is important to note, 
however, that- as of the end of October 2011 - nearly 48 percent (20) of these prolific POST 
offenders were in some fonn of custody. 
Next, a paired t-test was used to identify any differences between the criminal 
motivation of POST offenders in the 12 months leading up to their acceptance to the program 
and the 12 months following their acceptance. Due to lacking availability of data for some 
offenders in either pre or post-nomination, some POST offenders were omitted fi·om the 
analysis (n =166). Upon entering the number of suspected incidents from the appropriate 
time frames, the differential analysis determined that the pre-POST mean was 3.03 incidents. 
The post-POST mean was 0.83 incidents (see Figure 2 and Table 5). FU!thennore, the t-test 
produced a 95 percent confidence interval for the 72.6 percent reduction (Mean= 2.2 
incidents, with extreme statistical significance (p < 0.0001). 
The final assessment of the POST program's contribution to the Part I crime rate 
reduction was an analysis ofCMPD's clearance rates. Founded on the assettion that 
clearance rates can most effectively be increased by providing the investigators with more 
information regarding potential suspects (Walker, 2011), it stands to reason that a properly-
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identified list of actively-motivated offenders- and a program which increases the 
supervision of and knowledge of these offenders - would ultimately lead to higher clearance 
rates. Figure 3, provided by the CMPD Crime Analysis Division, repmis that the clearance 
rates for property crimes have steadily increased since 2008. In fact, 2009 and 2010 enjoyed 
the highest property crime clearance rates in the I 0 year period reviewed. The data for 2011 
ended in August, with a 19.7 percent clearance rate at that time. The August 2011 clearance 
rate is 7.3 percent higher than the 2000 rate, though within one standard deviation. Therefore, 
though a definitive attribution is difficult to summize from the cutTen! data, it stands to 
reason that the increased supervision and prioritization of the identified subset of offenders 
has contributed to an increase in clearance rates and a decrease in crime rate. 
Summary 
The POST program has provided three goals: identify the small percentage of 
offenders committing an dispropmtionate number of Part I crimes in the Charlotte-
Mecklenburg community, hold those offenders accountable for their crimes through a 
collaborative prioritization process and, in doing so, contribute to a reduction in Charlotte's 
Pmi I crime rate. Upon creating operational definitions for each goal and collecting the 
necessary data to measure the program's effectiveness at attaining the goals, the final results 
produced a mixed assessment. According to the data presented, the program appropriately 
identifies roughly half of the most active and current offenders. However, as will be 
discussed in the conclusion, this is both an informational and a potentially misleading 
statistic. 
Regarding the program's ability to hold POST offenders accountable for their crimes 
and aid in the reduction of Charlotte's crime, the current data suggests that a POST offender 
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is less-likely to be held accountable upon disposition than control offenders. However, this 
appears to be the result of plea anangements resulting in the consolidation of numerous 
cases. On a positive note, the data indicates that POST offenders are significantly less likely 
to recidivate once assigned to the program. These findings demonstrate the POST program's 
potential contribution to a decrease in the number of reported incidents and an increase in 
clearance rates. A considerable amount of attention will be devoted to these specific results 
in the cunent conclusion. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
Since the beginning of the 21 '1 century, the Pati I crime rate has begun to decline 
across the nation (Bureau of Justice, 2011). The Charlotte-Mecklenburg area has reported a 
similar trend. Despite these declines, however, Paii I crime in Charlotte remains persistently 
high when compared to the national average (www.city-data.com/city/Charlotte-North-
Carolina.html). 
In April 2008, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department acknowledged that a 
notable portion of the repmied Pati I incidents was attributed to a small number of repeat 
offenders. Knowing that various actions are already in place to address the potential victim 
and crime oppmiunity sides of the problem analysis (crime) triangle (Felson, 2006; 
www.popcenter.org), CMPD implemented an initiative designed at combining a limited 
number of CMPD resources with various other representatives of the criminal justice system 
in an effmi to direct attention to those offenders exhibiting a high motivation to commit Part 
I crimes against Charlotte's citizens. The POST program, as it came to be known, was the 
focus of the current evaluation. 
POST has stated three program goals. The strategy seeks to identifY those individuals 
whose criminal behavior significantly impacts the Charlotte crime rate and/or the fear of 
crime in a community. Second, POST intends to hold these priority offenders accountable for 
their criminal actions. In doing so, POST aims to attain the third goal of reducing Charlotte's 
Part I crime rates. The purpose of the current thesis was to evaluate the POST program's 
effectiveness at attaining each of these stated goals. 
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Summary of Findings 
First, a series of comparisons to a generated list of control offenders were used to 
detem1ine that POST identifies between 31 and 60 percent of the actively motivated 
offenders. This range was based on the comparisons of the POST data set to the first 
generated list of 100 control offenders (31 percent), followed by the comparison of the POST 
data set to the age-filtered list of control offenders (60 percent). The most narrowly filtered 
comparison yielded a 52 percent identification rate, with admission that additional motivated 
offenders have been identified but have not been accepted to the program due to being in 
custody. 
Second, the evaluation determined that the program holds POST offenders 
accountable for felony crime in roughly 35 percent of the cases. This is lower than the 
control group's 44 percent. Third, the thesis demonstrated that 55 percent of the POST 
offenders have experienced at least one period of extended incarceration. Furthetmore, of 
the top 10-12 percent of POST offenders, 48 percent is in custody. Most notably, however, 
is that actively motivated offenders are roughly 73 percent less likely to commit new crimes 
upon being prioritized by the POST program. Similarly, CMPD's property crime clearance 
rates increased 7.3 percent from 2000 to August 2011 and 8.7 percent from 2007 to August 
2011. 
Weaknesses 
Before these findings can be futiher discussed, several weaknesses with the cunent 
evaluation must be acknowledged. Some of the weaknesses involve the availability of 
information necessary to accurately evaluate various aspects of the program. For example, 
cases presented to the District Attomey's Office could not be individually reviewed to 
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determine the exact reason for voluntary dismissal. Also, numerous offenders have been on 
the POST list for a shmt period of time, preventing an interpretation of the results from being 
completely representative of the entire population. Fmthermore, some of the weaknesses 
stem from intangibles. For example, no law enforcement agency can identifY and prioritize 
five percent of the offender population. CMPD would have roughly 37,500 offenders on the 
POST list. Also, a true detennination of the number of Part I crimes a vetted by increased 
supervision or incarceration is likely improbable. 
Additional weaknesses originated from the implementation process of the program 
and the manner in which data is cunently collected. The most critical weakness is that the 
POST program does not cunently have any measurable objectives. An absence of objectives 
creates multiple issues. When attempting to evaluate the program's effectiveness at 
satisfying the stated goals, no existing operational definition requires the researcher to create 
a measure or apply an existing literary standard. In such a situation, the author may 
potentially operationalize the goal in a manner which fails to provide a valid measurement of 
the effectiveness. Though CMPD approved the creation of operationalized goals for the 
purpose of this study, the definitions have not been formally accepted by the program nor 
applied as objectives. Therefore, it must be recognized that the definitions created in the 
current thesis may be potentially invalid measures. Though it is possible that the employed 
operational definitions employed may be inadequate, however, this does not nullifY the 
empirical suppmt produced by the current study. 
In addition, with no measurable objectives, the program is not consistently gathering 
the necessary data for an appropriate program evaluation. Besides the obvious difficulties for 
the researcher, the program suffers from this, as well. Systematically collecting data specific 
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to the stated objectives allows for insight into the status of the program at any given snapshot 
in time. For example, while executing the queries used to create the comparison control 
offenders, multiple individuals were identified who exhibited more active motivation than 
some of the current POST offenders. Fmthermore, the evaluation process highlighted an 
error in one of the fields in the ranking formula, which was updated and easily corrected. 
Discussion 
When determining if POST is an effective program, capable of becoming a model 
crime reduction strategy, certain questions were considered. Is the program supported by 
existing scholarly research? Do the findings demonstrate an effective benefit to the 
program? The current study answered each of those questions. 
Litermy Support 
Immediately, POST begins the evaluation in the effectiveness winning column. As 
Walker (2011) advised, "The crucial difference is that these (effective) innovations involve 
carefully planned and focused police strategies that are solidly based on research evidence on 
what works and what does not work" (p.l 03). The current study briefly summarized 
traditionally-employed interventions, which have been proven ineffective crime reduction 
strategies: preventative patrol, reliance on detectives and three-strikes laws. The POST 
comprehensive model excludes each of these three ineffective strategies as emphasized 
aspects of the program. 
On the contrary, the emphasized aspects of POST align well with the effective actions 
reviewed from the existing empirical research. The first goal of the POST program is to 
identify those offenders who are actively committing an disproportionate amount of Part I 
offenses against Charlotte's residents. The existence of a subset of highly-motivated 
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offenders has been accepted by a multitude of scholars (Felson, 2006; Shannon, McKim, 
Cuny, and Haffner, 1988; Tracy, Wolfgang, and Figlio, 1985; Wolfgang, Figlio, and Sellin, 
1982; Walker, 2011). 
In addition to motivated offender literature, scholars lend suppmi to the tactics 
employed by the POST program to specifically address identified offenders. For example, 
research indicates that criminals are more likely to recidivate within a shmi period of time 
from their last police contact (Bureau of Justice, 2002; Kurlycheck, Brame, and Bushway, 
2006). The POST program not only factors the time lag between contact and recidivism into 
the weighted ranking formula, but also requires case managers to reevaluate each and every 
offender released from custody within 48 hours. The purpose of immediate reevaluation is to 
1) confirm residency, 2) re-establish supervision and 3) confirm that the offender is still 
motivated to commit crime. Another example of the literary support is the prioritization of 
identified offenders. As Walker (2011) concluded, "If we could successfully identify and 
effectively respond to that 6 percent, we could achieve a major reduction in serious crime" 
(pg.78). As described earlier, POST has established a collaborative partnership with 
representatives from every step of the prosecutorial process, from Police Attorney to law 
enforcement to Magistrate to Crime Lab to District Attorney to Community Corrections. 
Felson's (2006) research on increased supervision also specifically supports the 
POST program. As Felson explained, motivated offenders exhibit a number of 
characteristics which make reduction efforts by the police difficult. Motivated offenders are 
typically generalists. Motivated offenders operate in familiar settings or under considerable 
anonymity. Motivated offenders forage, meaning they thrive on seizing presented 
opportunities for quick crime strikes. POST accounts for these characteristics, however. 
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Through the use of static surveillance, various forms of electronic surveillance and 
confidential informants, prioritized offenders' ability to forage is reduced. The fact that the 
number of POST offender Patt I incidents was reduced suppotts the assertion that the 
prioritization and supervision associated with the program impacted recidivism. An analysis 
of the impact of electronic monitoring on motivated offenders' recidivism is beyond the 
scope of the current thesis; however, it is feasible that this tactic played a substantial role in 
the reduction. In addition, the actionable information produced by the supervision is 
provided to the detectives, addressing Walker's (2011) issues with incident investigations 
and clearance rates. 
Despite all of the theoretical support, however, the POST program cannot be 
recommended as an effective crime reduction model without adherence to research regarding 
evidence-based, planned change (for example, Walker, 2011; Welsh and Harris, 2008; 
www.popcenter.org). According to this literature, the project/program/policy should follow 
certain major sequential steps: problem analysis -7 evidence-based intervention design -7 
monitored implementation -7 evaluation and revision. These revisions can be applied as 
changes to the cu11'ent intervention or may facilitate the creation of a new future strategy. To 
supplement this planned-change process, scholars agree that the intervention strategy should 
also be na11'owly focused. Though certain expectations have been more closely satisfied than 
others, the POST program has successfully achieved each of these steps. 
From the initial observation of a potential crime trend, to the in-depth field analysis of 
the COP project, CMPD exe1ted considerable effort into identifYing a specific, narrow 
problem: the persistent recidivism of Pmt I crime by a small number of offenders. Upon 
properly identifying the problem, the POST program designed an intervention strategy which 
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considered the traditional ineffective strategies and was guided by several forms of evidence-
based information (e.g., the weighted ranking system, COMPSTAT, literature reviews). 
Regarding the strategy, itself, no true guiding example existed. However, recognizing this 
weakness, the program's Executive Staff has maintained an emphasized degree of flexibility 
since inception. 
POST has struggled at times with monitoring the program's implementation. The bi-
weekly meetings between the Executive Staff and the case managers, combined with the off-
week meetings amongst just the Executive Staff, the law enforcement portion of the program 
is closely monitored. However, the adherence to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
by other partners is typically assessed only in those rare occunences which draw unique 
attention to a particular case. It is a logical assertion that some of the fault lies with the 
absence of measurable objectives to be periodically analyzed. The final major step-
evaluation and revision- is the phase in which the program currently rests. Overall, 
however, the POST program adheres well to the mandate of evidence-based planned change 
models. 
Interpretation of Findings 
With overwhelming literary support, the POST program must now exhibit empirical 
evidence of effectiveness. Did the cunent study's data analyses demonstrate the program's 
ability to effectively identify motivated offenders, hold those offenders accountable for their 
crimes, and contribute to Charlotte's reduction in Part I crime? To answer concisely, the 
POST program is well on the way to effectively identifying motivated offenders and is 
reducing, without question, the amount of recidivism exhibited by those identified offenders. 
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The findings did not suggest the program is effectively holding the offenders accountable for 
their offenses, though this must not be taken completely at face value. 
Regarding the identification of the correct offenders, the data demonstrated an 
accuracy rate ranging from 31 to 60 percent, with the most stringent comparison producing a 
52 percent match. However, as was mentioned previously, 13 of the remaining 24 
recommended offenders were in custody at the time of the analysis. Thus, they could not be 
nominated for POST, regardless of identification. Therefore, an interpretation of this result 
in the most literal sense should be cautious. 
The more glaring findings are the contradictory analyses ofthe second and third 
goals. The paired t-test produced an average 2.2 incident reduction in the 166 POST 
offenders sampled within the first year of being on POST. This reduction in recidivism was 
repmted with p < 0.0001. Therefore, actively-motivated offenders committed an average of 
2.2 incidents within 12 months of being nominated for POST than they committed in the 12 
months leading up to the nomination. 
To put the program's impact into a more detailed perspective, five POST offenders 
who are cmTently in 90+ day custody and five similarly-ranked control offenders from the 
generated top offenders list were compared individually (see Appendix B). The five 
comparisons provided a clear example of the program's significant reduction in recidivism. 
During their similarly-ranked POST offender's incarceration periods, the control offenders 
were named as suspects in 41 Part I incidents (4, 6, 25, 5 and 1, respectively). Though 
neither the program nor this thesis attempt to estimate the number of incidents ave1ted by 
incarceration, it is clear that offenders ranked similarly to the incapacitated POST offenders 
continued to victimize Charlotte. 
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With such positive findings, one would expect the conviction rate for POST offenders 
to be high, at least higher than the same group of offenders exhibited prior to being 
prioritized by the program. However, POST offenders received a guilty disposition at a 
lower frequency than both the control group and the comparison to the pre-nomination 
evaluation period. There are three possible explanations for this finding. First, the 
operational definition was an invalid measure of"accountability." Second, such prolific 
offenders may plausibly hold a fearful reputation in the community which would hinder the 
District Attorneys' ability to maintain a willing victim/witness throughout the duration of the 
prosecutorial process. The third- and likely- explanation is that POST offenders' cases are 
being pleaded through inclusive agreements which encompass all pending matters. 
It is tme that POST does not seek out habitual felons for the POST list. As was 
explained, these offenders are often not the most active offenders in a given snapshot. 
However, with sentencing guidelines, the most guaranteed method of obtaining substantial 
incarceration is through three-strikes enhancements. It stands to reason that highly motivated 
offenders would have multiple cases within a shmi time frame, hindering the 
compmimentalization process without some form of consolidation. Therefore, as part of the 
pminership with the program, the District Attorney's Office has conveyed the notion that 
plea agreements are often necessary to compmimentalize the felony convictions, satisfying 
the requirements of the sentence enhancements. However, the goal of the program is to 
ultimately hold the offenders accountable for their attributed Part I crimes, and nearly 76 
percent of these offenses are not meeting this expectation. 
The justification for the global plea deals is based on the assumption that the sentence 
enhancements are being properly utilized. However, the research demonstrated a historical 
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national trend of the underutilization of three-strikes laws (Auerhahn, 2002; Jones and 
Newbern, 2006; Kovandzic, 2001). Furthermore, since May 2008, 1164 of the 1517 
Mecklenburg County habitual felon indictments have been dismissed by the District 
Attorney's Office (CMPD, 2011). Thus, the dismissal of POST offender cases with living, 
breathing documented victims as a bargaining tool seems futile and a clear breakdown in the 
pursuit of a stated program goal when only 22.7 percent of habitual felon indictments end 
with a guilty disposition. 
Recommendations 
Especially with a demonstrated reduction in recidivism by some of Charlotte's most 
active offenders, the current evaluation concludes that the POST program is an effective 
strategy to reduce Part I crime. The study has, however, highlighted some aspects of the 
program which watTant consideration. Therefore, various recommendations are provided and 
discussed below (see Appendix C). Certain recommendations address the design and/or 
implementation of the intervention strategy. Other recommendations relate specifically to 
the effort to direct the department's resources toward individual offenders. All 
recommendations are presented with the ultimate objective of bolstering the program's 
overall effectiveness. 
First, CMPD should consider writing a mission statement for the POST program. 
Utilizing this study to provide scholarly references and a detailed analysis of the problem, 
POST must explain the need for the initiative. A mission statement may also facilitate the 
program evolving, again, into a formalized depattmental policy. 
Second, the currently stated goals should be maintained. Since goals are "broad 
statements intended to provide direction for change" (Welsh and HatTis, 2008, pg. 94), 
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research suppmts the three goals of identifying the appropriate subset of offenders and 
prioritizing them in order to hold them accountable for their crimes and, ultimately, 
contributing to the reduction in Part I rates. However, the program must present specific, 
operationally-defined objectives with which to measure the outcome achieved by the 
intervention. Each objective should include a time frame by which the objective will be 
completed, a target population, a specific intended result and a standard for measuring the 
success. An example of an objective to measure the third goal of contributing to the 
reduction in Charlotte's Part I crime by reducing the recidivism of POST offenders would be 
as follows: After 12 months from the newly-documented start date, the average (mean) 
number of reported Part I incidents involving a POST offender as a suspect will be reduced 
10 percent from the previous 12 month review period total. This information will be 
collected from the CMPD reported incident management system (KBCOPS). 
Third, the POST program must establish a standard of collecting the data necessary to 
accurately measure each of the defined objectives. For example, in an effort to detennine the 
program's effectiveness at holding POST offenders accountable for their crimes, it would be 
beneficial to document infmmation such as offenders' POST start dates, new offense dates 
and disposition. Other useful data would be pertaining to custody statuses and electronic 
monitoring/community corrections. 
Fourth, it is recommended that POST conduct quarterly recalculation of the query 
used in the cunent thesis to generate the control offender list. By doing this, the POST 
program will illuminate any potential candidates for review and recommendation to the case 
managers as candidates for the program. As patt of this process, the Executive Staff should 
consider other selection/prediction attempts (e.g., Greenwood and Abrahamse, 1982), which 
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weighted juvenile histories of similar offenses and employment as indicators of future 
offending. 
Fifth, the POST program's Executive Staff should consider proposing to the District 
Attorney's Office a policy regarding the speedy disposition of POST offender cases. In 
giving the benefit of the doubt that the police are producing adequate felony cases and the 
prosecutors are willing to place particular emphasis on the cases (a Ia three-strikes 
enhancements), the a possible solution to the accountability issue may be disposing of POST 
cases quickly. With buy-in from the Executive Staff and the Crime Lab, cooperation by the 
prosecutors the only necessary element. 
In closing, the cu!Tent thesis has identified a clear need for further research into this 
intervention. With the exception of a neighboring agency, which followed the example set 
by CMPD's program, no similar offender-driven program exists in North Carolina, to date. 
The cu!Tent thesis provided the first true evaluation of the POST program since its 
implementation in the Spring of2009. The methods used in the study produced evidence of 
the program's ability to significantly reduce recidivism by the defined subset of offenders. 
However, the study was limited in many respects. Also, with this praise came the 
demonstration that POST has room for improvement in other desired areas. These 
weaknesses are better identified through research than in the form of sensationalized legal 
repercussiOn. 
Sam Walker (2011) appropriately stated that "(w)e should not seek perfection, only 
an improvement over what we have been doing. If it leads to a substantial improvement, 
even though less than perfect, it would be useful" (pg. 85). The current thesis has provided 
literary and empirical suppmt that the CMPD offender-driven initiative known as the Priority 
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Offender Strategy Team is an effective crime reduction strategy. However, the program and 
its Executive Staff must not be satisfied with this conclusion. Rather, the demand for 
consistent assessment and persistent adaptability must remain. 
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Appendix A: Memorandum of Understanding 
Memorandum of Understanding 
Concerning the Establishment of the 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Priority Offender Strategy (POS) 
Among the Undersigned Agencies 
THIS MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU), made and entered into 
between the undersigned agencies, sets forth guidelines regarding the establishment of a 
comprehensive Priority Offender Strategy for the City of Charlotte and Mecklenburg 
County. 
1. VISION STATEMENT 
1.1 The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Depmtment will develop partnerships 
that foster an environment whereby priority offenders are identified, held 
accountable and shall not prey upon our citizens. 
2. PURPOSE 
2.1 Provide a framework and working mechanism for the organization of a 
priority offender program to address issues that are common to 
patticipating agencies and to assure the success of the initiative 
through the achievement of coordination and cooperation. 
2.2 Define the working relationships of the parties to the MOU. 
2.3 Outline the intent of the patties regarding the implementation, 
operation, and administration of a Priority Offender Strategy. 
3. OBJECTIVES 
3.1 Develop a formal criteria-based system that defines and identifies 
those whom we have determined to be a priority offender, and develop 
the methodology to share this classification with all of the agencies 
who may come in contact with a pribrity offender. 
3.2 Establish, and adhere to, a regular and frequent meeting schedule for 
the program's participating agencies. 
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3.3 Establish a comprehensive victim inclusion standard to ensure that the 
victim(s) of the priority offender are kept informed about the 
offender/case status. 
3.4 Identify the required staffing resources for each pmiicipating agency. 
4. INTERAGENCY POLICY GROUP 
4.1 The program will be managed by an Interagency Policy Group whose 
membership will include one command-level member from each 
participating agency. 
4.2 The chairperson for the Interagency Policy Group will be selected by the 
group. 
4.3 Each member will have an equal vote on all matters before the board. 
4.4 The Interagency Policy Group will adopt a quarterly meeting 
schedule. 
4.5 The Interagency Policy Group will provide quarterly reports on 
the activities of the program to the agency head of each 
patiicipating agency. 
4.6 The Interagency Policy Group may accept additional 
participating agencies to this MOU upon majority vote. 
4.7 The Interagency Policy Group may appoint committees, working 
groups, and other entities to assist in the management and 
development of the program. 
5. INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP 
5.1 Each pmiicipating agency in the program agrees to provide at least one 
staff member to represent them on the Interagency Working Group. 
5.2 The chairperson for the Interagency Policy Group will be selected by the 
group. 
5.3 The Interagency Working Group will adopt a bi-weekly meeting 
schedule. 
5.4 Additional members may be assigned to this group as detennined by 
the members of the Interagency Policy Group based on workload and 
the needs of the program. 
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6. FINANCIAL 
6.1 Participating agency employees will carry out designated functions at 
their own agency's expense, including salaries and benefits and local 
transportation. 
6.2 Should . independent funding be obtained for the operation, or 
furtherance, of the program, the Interagency Policy Group shall 
detetmine how the funding will be utilized. 
7. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
7.1 Any disputes that may arise between the participating agencies 
concerning the operations of the program shall be refened to the 
Interagency Policy Group for resolution. 
7.2 The final decision on disputes will be made by the chairperson of the 
Interagency Policy Group. 
8. AMENDMENTS 
8.1 Amendments to this MOU shall be proposed upon a majority vote of 
the Interagency Policy Group and approval by all signatures to this 
MOU. 
8.2 Acceptance of additional pmiicipating agencies shall be considered an 
amendment to this MOU and shall not cause the need for a new MOU. 
9. DURATION AND TERMINATION 
9.1 This MOU shall remain in existence until such time a participating 
agency withdraws from the agreement. 
9.2 Any agency may withdraw from this agreement upon a 30-day notice 
in writing to the other patiicipating agencies. 
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IN FURTHERANCE OF their respective goals, objectives, and missions, the patties 
jointly agree to abide by the provisions ofthis MOU. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the patties hereto have caused this MOU to be duly 
executed. 
Agency: ______________ ~----------------------------------------
By: __________________________ ___ Date: ________________ _ 
Agency: ______________________________________________________ __ 
By: __________________________ __ Date: ________________ _ 
Agency: 
By: Date: 
Agency: 
By: Date: 
Agency: 
By: Date: 
Agency: 
By: Date: 
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Appendix B: POST Offender and Non-POST Offender Comparisons 
1. POST Offender 4: from acceptance to POST on 2/26/2009 unti14/30/2009, this 
offender was named in 0 Index offenses. At this point, POST Offender 4 was 
incarcerated. From release on 9/4/2009 unti16117/2011, this offender was named as a 
suspect in 6 incidents (5 Index). This offender was on Probation, as well as 
NCDOCC ordered EM for a portion of the evaluation period. This offender ranked 8. 
This offender was documented as a POST success. 
Control Offender 818: from 2/25/2009 unti14/30/2009, this offender was named in 2 
Index offenses. During POST Offender 4's first incarceration period (5/1/2009-
9/4/2009), Control Offender 818 was named in 2 Index offenses. Upon POST 
Offender 4's release period of9/4/2009 until6/17/2011, Control Offender 818 was 
named as a suspect in 23 Index offenses. Since POST Offender 4 's incarceration, 
Control Offender 818 was named as a suspect in 2 additional Index offenses before 
being incarcerated on 6/20/2011. This offender ranked 9. This offender has never 
been on POST. 
2. POST Offender 184: from acceptance to POST on 10/29/2008 unti112/15/2009, this 
offender was named as a suspect in 3 Index offenses. This offender was on probation 
during the evaluation period. This offender ranked 28. This offender was 
documented as a POST success. 
Control Offender 851: From 10/29/2009 unti112/15/2009, this offender was named 
as a suspect in 7 Index offenses. During POST Offender 184' s incarceration 
(12/15/2009- present), Control Offender 851 has been named as a suspect in 6 
additional Index offenses. This offender was on probation and EM during the 
evaluation period. This offender ranked 17. This offender has never been on POST. 
3. POST Offender 322: from acceptance to POST on 12/01/2009 until 01/14/2009, this 
offender was named in 1 Index offense, before being incarcerated. This offender 
ranked 30. This offender was documented as a POST success. 
Control Offender 791: from 12/01/2009 until 01114/2009, this offender was named 
in 1 Index offense. Since POST Offender 322's incarceration on 01/14/2009, Control 
Offender 23 has been named as a suspect in 25 index offenses. This offender was 
also on probation and EM during the evaluation period. This offender ranked 25. 
This offender has never been on POST. 
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4. POST Offender 59: from acceptance to POST on 02/26/2009 until 03/31/2009, this 
offender was named as a suspect in 3 Index offenses, before being incarcerated. 
From the offender's release on 12/29/2009 until 08/02/2011, this offender was named 
as a suspect in 1 Index offense before being incarcerated. This offender ranked 3 9. 
This offender was on probation and EM during the evaluation period. This offender 
was documented as a POST success. 
Control Offender 693: from 02/26/2009 until 03/31/2009, this offender was named 
as a suspect in 0 Index offenses. During POST Offender 59's incarceration 
(03/31/2009 - 12/29/2009), Control Offender 693 was named as a suspect in 5 Index 
offenses. Upon POST Offender 59's release on 12/29/2009 until 08/02/2011, Control 
Offender 693 has been named as a suspect in 10 Index offenses. This offender was 
on probation during the evaluation period. This offender ranked 47. This offender 
has never been on POST. 
5. POST Offender 597: from acceptance to POST on 01/08/2010 until 03/03/2010, this 
offender was listed as a suspect in 0 Index offenses. From this offender's release on 
07119/2010 until12/08/2010, this offender was listed as a suspect in 1 Index offense. 
This offender was on EM during the evaluation period. This offender is ranked 103. 
This offender was documented as a POST success. 
Control Offender 819: From 01/08/2010 until 03/03/2010, this offender was named 
as a suspect in 0 Index offenses. During POST Offender 597's incarceration 
(03/03/2010- 07119/2010), Control Offender 819 was listed as a suspect in 1 Index 
offense and was incarcerated. This offender was on probation during the evaluation 
period. This offender is ranked 96. This offender has never been on POST. 
PRIORITIZING OFFENDERS 73 
Appendix C: POST Program Recommendations 
1. Write a POST program mission statement 
2. Maintain the currently-stated goals, but establish specific, operationally-defined 
objectives for each goal 
3. Establish a consistent method of collecting the data to measure the objectives 
4. Conduct quarterly recalculation of the "control offender" query, recommending any 
newly-identified motivated offenders 
5. Propose a policy for speedy disposition of POST offender cases 
6. Engage in additional research 
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Appendix D: Tables 
TABLE 1: POST Offender Felony Case Accountability After POST Statt Date (n = 357) 
Offender Date On Number Of Guilt~ Case Pet 
Number POST Cases Count Accountability 
1 10/6/2008 5 1 20.00% 
2 8/20/2008 2 1 50.00% 
3 7/8/2008 2 
4 9/25/2009 9 5 55.56% 
5 12/1/2008 8 4 50.00% 
6 12/17/2008 6 2 33.33% 
7 5/28/2008 
8 12/1/2008 
9 12/15/2010 11 5 45.45% 
10 12/1/2008 8 1 12.50% 
11 8/27/2008 8 2 25.00% 
12 12/15/2010 7 2 28.57% 
13 11/13/2009 4 2 50.00% 
14 3/16/2009 1 1 100.00% 
15 9/25/2009 4 4 100.00% 
16 12/1/2008 1 
17 10/20/2010 
18 6/11/2010 6 4 66.67% 
19 9/9/2010 3 1 33.33% 
20 7/1/2008 4 
21 4/20/2011 
22 7/16/2008 3 3 100.00% 
23 5/28/2008 3 3 100.00% 
24 10/6/2008 13 3 23.08% 
25 9/25/2009 4 1 25.00% 
26 7/1/2008 2 1 50.00% 
27 12/17/2008 1 1 100.00% 
28 8/20/2008 
29 5/28/2008 4 3 75.00% 
30 12/17/2008 5 2 40.00% 
31 5/29/2008 4 2 50.00% 
32 7/1/2008 8 5 62.50% 
33 12/1/2008 7 4 57.14% 
34 11/13/2009 3 3 100.00% 
35 9/25/2009 
36 12/1/2008 
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37 2/4/2010 6 1 16.67% 
38 2/4/2010 6 3 50.00% 
39 9/22/2008 10 5 50.00% 
40 5/29/2008 7 1 14.29% 
41 5/28/2008 
42 10/22/2008 5 1 20.00% 
43 12/17/2008 5 2 40.00% 
44 9/22/2008 
45 11/13/2009 5 
46 6/1/2009 6 5 83.33% 
47 12/17/2008 14 4 28.57% 
48 12/1/2008 7 6 85.71% 
49 7/27/2011 2 
50 3/23/2009 
51 12/1/2008 7 4 57.14% 
52 1/30/2009 2 1 50.00% 
53 1/30/2009 5 
54 12/17/2008 11 2 18.18% 
55 5/29/2008 6 1 16.67% 
56 1/30/2009 2 
57 6/1/2009 8 4 50.00% 
58 12/17/2008 3 1 33.33% 
59 5/29/2008 14 4 28.57% 
60 6/11/2010 8 4 50.00% 
61 5/17/2010 10 3 30.00% 
62 5/28/2008 5 
63 6/1/2009 9 3 33.33% 
64 12/17/2008 3 
65 4/6/2011 3 
66 5/29/2008 14 2 14.29% 
67 12/17/2008 5 4 80.00% 
68 1/30/2009 9 2 22.22% 
69 12/1/2008 7 2 28.57% 
70 12/18/2008 6 1 16.67% 
71 8/27/2008 
72 8/20/2008 3 
73 3/25/2009 38 11 28.95% 
74 6/4/2008 2 2 100.00% 
75 5/28/2008 4 3 75.00% 
76 8/20/2008 6 3 50.00% 
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77 12/17/2008 11 2 18.18% 
78 12/17/2008 
79 12/1/2008 
80 9/12/2011 2 
81 3/23/2009 6 
82 6/30/2010 3 
83 8/20/2008 
84 1/12/2011 3 1 33.33% 
85 5/29/2008 3 1 33.33% 
86 2/26/2009 4 2 50.00% 
87 12/17/2008 
88 1/30/2009 3 2 66.67% 
89 8/25/2010 
90 6/30/2010 6 
91 9/9/2010 4 
92 12/1/2008 2 
93 12/1/2008 5 2 40.00% 
94 6/11/2010 
95 7/1/2008 3 2 66.67% 
96 3/25/2009 5 3 60.00% 
97 12/17/2008 3 
98 12/17/2008 1 1 100.00% 
99 11/13/2009 3 2 66.67% 
100 9/22/2010 3 2 66.67% 
101 12/1/2008 10 4 40.00% 
102 6/1/2009 5 2 40.00% 
103 5/29/2008 20 7 35.00% 
104 1/30/2009 7 3 42.86% 
105 5/22/2008 6 
106 1/30/2009 5 1 20.00% 
107 12/1/2008 7 3 42.86% 
108 5/29/2008 6 
109 7/14/2010 8 2 25.00% 
110 12/17/2008 8 4 50.00% 
111 12/17/2008 11 3 27.27% 
112 9/25/2009 9 2 22.22% 
113 7/1/2008 1 
114 1/8/2010 
115 6/24/2009 5 1 20.00% 
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116 4/6/2011 11 
117 2/5/2010 7 2 28.57% 
118 11/13/2009 13 8 61.54% 
119 12/17/2008 
120 6/1/2009 4 2 50.00% 
121 12/17/2008 
122 5/28/2008 4 2 50.00% 
123 11/3/2010 2 
124 12/1/2008 6 1 16.67% 
125 3/25/2009 14 5 35.71% 
126 8/10/2011 
127 2/4/2010 10 2 20.00% 
128 1/8/2010 
129 8/25/2010 3 2 66.67% 
130 5/28/2008 9 4 44.44% 
131 5/29/2008 
132 5/28/2008 8 4 50.00% 
133 2/26/2009 7 4 57.14% 
134 5/28/2008 6 2 33.33% 
135 9/25/2009 3 1 33.33% 
136 5/28/2008 
137 11/17/2010 
138 7/14/2010 
139 3/9/2011 6 2 33.33% 
140 9/22/2010 8 2 25.00% 
141 12/1/2008 
142 6/1/2009 7 
143 12/17/2008 
144 12/1/2008 4 3 75.00% 
145 5/28/2008 11 6 54.55% 
146 12/17/2008 15 
147 3/25/2009 4 1 25.00% 
148 8/16/2010 11 3 27.27% 
149 12/17/2008 16 4 25.00% 
150 3/25/2009 3 3 100.00% 
151 11/13/2009 7 1 14.29% 
152 6/11/2010 3 2 66.67% 
153 11/13/2009 3 2 66.67% 
154 12/1/2010 4 2 50.00% 
155 8/17/2009 5 3 60.00% 
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156 5/28/2008 7 7 100.00% 
157 7/14/2010 4 1 25.00% 
158 7/25/2008 3 
159 5/28/2008 13 
160 10/20/2010 3 1 33.33% 
161 6/11/2010 
162 5/28/2008 3 
163 10/16/2009 1 1 100.00% 
164 6/30/2010 1 
165 7/1/2008 6 1 16.67% 
166 12/17/2008 11 3 27.27% 
167 4/16/2010 7 3 42.86% 
168 7/1/2008 12 4 33.33% 
169 7/23/2008 9 3 33.33% 
170 7/28/2008 
171 12/17/2008 8 
172 1/30/2009 11 3 27.27% 
173 6/11/2010 8 2 25.00% 
174 5/22/2008 10 4 40.00% 
175 5/28/2008 
176 5/29/2008 4 3 75.00% 
177 8/25/2010 1 1 100.00% 
178 2/26/2009 12 5 41.67% 
179 5/22/2008 5 
180 12/1/2008 5 3 60.00% 
181 12/17/2008 6 3 50.00% 
182 12/18/2008 6 4 66.67% 
183 3/9/2011 3 2 66.67% 
184 3/25/2009 
185 12/17/2008 6 2 33.33% 
186 11/5/2009 
187 11/6/2009 7 2 28.57% 
188 12/17/2008 10 5 50.00% 
189 8/27/2008 6 3 50.00% 
190 3/16/2009 6 3 50.00% 
191 8/25/2010 16 5 31.25% 
192 5/28/2008 12 7 58.33% 
193 7/27/2011 
194 12/17/2008 
195 12/17/2008 6 3 50.00% 
196 8/28/2008 10 3 30.00% 
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197 3/17/2009 
198 7/13/2011 3 
199 12/1/2010 
200 7/27/2011 
201 8/25/2010 9 3 33.33% 
202 2/4/2010 7 2 28.57% 
203 8/17/2009 1 
204 1/8/2010 8 
205 3/25/2009 3 
206 8/17/2009 5 2 40.00% 
207 1/28/2011 1 
208 11/13/2009 5 4 80.00% 
209 5/17/2010 2 1 50.00% 
210 3/16/2009 19 4 21.05% 
211 7/14/2010 3 
212 5/29/2008 4 1 25.00% 
213 5/28/2008 14 5 35.71% 
214 1/8/2010 
215 6/1/2009 6 2 33.33% 
216 12/17/2008 4 
217 9/25/2009 4 
218 5/28/2008 6 2 33.33% 
219 7/28/2010 10 1 10.00% 
220 5/28/2008 5 2 40.00% 
221 1/30/2009 11 2 18.18% 
222 5/29/2008 5 5 100.00% 
223 12/17/2008 1 1 100.00% 
224 12/17/2008 1 1 100.00% 
225 2/4/2010 5 2 40.00% 
226 7/14/2010 4 
227 8/16/2010 2 1 50.00% 
228 10/16/2009 3 1 33.33% 
229 10/1/2008 11 6 54.55% 
230 11/13/2009 3 1 33.33% 
231 2/26/2009 3 3 100.00% 
232 5/28/2008 3 1 33.33% 
233 11/13/2009 4 1 25.00% 
234 12/17/2008 2 1 50.00% 
235 6/1/2009 
236 12/1/2008 14 6 42.86% 
237 9/22/2008 7 2 28.57% 
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238 10/16/2009 3 
239 8/13/2008 22 6 27.27% 
240 9/25/2009 7 4 57.14% 
241 5/28/2008 13 7 53.85% 
242 3/9/2011 
243 12/17/2008 11 1 9.09% 
244 5/28/2008 23 6 26.09% 
245 8/17/2009 12 2 16.67% 
246 12/17/2008 2 
247 5/28/2008 16 9 56.25% 
248 1/8/2010 4 1 25.00% 
249 5/28/2008 5 3 60.00% 
250 3/25/2009 2 1 50.00% 
251 3/15/2010 
252 5/28/2008 9 4 44.44% 
253 12/17/2008 
254 9/16/2009 4 1 25.00% 
255 3/25/2009 1 
256 12/17/2008 12 1 8.33% 
257 12/17/2008 5 3 60.00% 
258 7/11/2008 8 4 50.00% 
259 3/9/2011 1 
260 12/17/2008 6 
261 7/28/2008 2 1 50.00% 
262 11/13/2009 6 3 50.00% 
263 8/17/2009 5 1 20.00% 
264 5/28/2008 11 5 45.45% 
265 1/8/2010 1 
266 5/28/2008 9 4 44.44% 
267 12/17/2008 7 3 42.86% 
268 11/13/2009 1 
269 3/31/2010 11 3 27.27% 
270 4/6/2011 3 
271 11/13/2009 10 8 80.00% 
272 5/28/2008 15 6 40.00% 
273 3/31/2010 5 
274 3/25/2009 7 
275 8/16/2010 
276 1/30/2009 4 1 25.00% 
277 4/16/2010 4 4 100.00% 
278 8/17/2009 6 1 16.67% 
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279 3/25/2009 4 2 50.00% 
280 12/17/2008 6 1 16.67% 
281 10/15/2009 10 2 20.00% 
282 6/11/2010 5 1 20.00% 
283 9/25/2009 
284 8/17/2009 11 2 18.18% 
285 12/1/2010 2 1 50.00% 
286 1/12/2011 1 
287 10/16/2009 3 1 33.33% 
288 6/11/2010 1 
289 12/17/2008 5 4 80.00% 
290 5/28/2008 6 3 50.00% 
291 12/17/2008 8 3 37.50% 
292 12/16/2010 2 1 50.00% 
293 3/15/2010 
294 6/1/2009 8 3 37.50% 
295 10/20/2010 11 3 27.27% 
296 11/17/2010 
297 7/15/2008 
298 8/12/2010 4 2 50.00% 
299 5/28/2008 2 2 100.00% 
300 6/1/2009 
301 1/8/2010 
302 12/17/2008 11 2 18.18% 
303 2/4/2010 7 4 57.14% 
304 3/15/2010 
305 1/30/2009 4 2 50.00% 
306 6/11/2010 1 
307 6/1/2009 7 3 42.86% 
308 11/13/2009 3 2 66.67% 
309 8/25/2010 8 4 50.00% 
310 11/13/2009 4 1 25.00% 
311 1/8/2010 10 3 30.00% 
312 11/17/2010 6 2 33.33% 
313 10/16/2009 3 
314 5/22/2008 
315 5/17/2010 1 
316 6/11/2010 6 4 66.67% 
317 12/17/2008 7 
318 8/10/2011 
319 8/10/2011 4 
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320 4/16/2010 4 
321 3/28/2011 
322 10/6/2010 4 
323 1/28/2011 2 1 50.00% 
324 9/24/2009 7 4 57.14% 
325 1/8/2010 1 
326 1/8/2010 11 4 36.36% 
327 10/7/2011 
328 6/11/2010 1 1 100.00% 
329 9/25/2009 10 3 30.00% 
330 11/13/2009 8 3 37.50% 
331 1/8/2010 5 1 20.00% 
332 2/4/2010 5 1 20.00% 
333 9/22/2010 3 1 33.33% 
334 6/15/2011 4 
335 6/15/2011 
336 3/31/2010 
337 9/25/2009 1 1 100.00% 
338 10/16/2009 
339 7/27/2011 1 
340 1/8/2010 4 
341 9/22/2010 2 1 50.00% 
342 1/8/2010 3 2 66.67% 
343 6/1/2011 5 1 20.00% 
344 3/31/2010 7 5 71.43% 
345 7/28/2010 1 
346 ·11/17 /2010 7 4 57.14% 
347 3/15/2010 
348 10/7/2010 1 
349 12/1/2010 5 4 80.00% 
350 6/11/2010 7 6 85.71% 
351 1/11/2011 1 
352 9/21/2011 
353 6/16/2011 
354 7/13/2011 
355 2/9/2011 
356 7/13/2011 1 
357 6/1/2011 1 1 100.00% 
1793 621 34.63% 
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TABLE 2: Control Offender Felony Case Accountability (n = 69) 
Offender Number Of Guilt~ Case Pet 
Number Cases Count Accountability 
1 25 2 8.00% 
2 17 10 58.82% 
3 27 14 51.85% 
4 5 3 60.00% 
5 34 20 58.82% 
6 18 8 44.44% 
7 4 3 75.00% 
8 12 10 83.33% 
9 18 9 50.00% 
10 7 2 28.57% 
11 30 18 60.00% 
12 14 8 57.14% 
13 21 4 19.05% 
14 25 6 24.00% 
15 20 7 35.00% 
16 21 5 23.81% 
17 8 3 37.50% 
18 24 8 33.33% 
. 
19 13 3 23.08% 
20 21 10 47.62% 
21 8 2 25.00% 
22 17 3 17.65% 
23 12 4 33.33% 
24 22 14 63.64% 
25 19 12 63.16% 
26 10 5 50.00% 
27 19 4 21.05% 
28 7 3 42.86% 
29 9 5 55.56% 
30 10 9 90.00% 
31 14 12 85.71% 
32 26 3 11.54% 
33 16 4 25.00% 
34 18 10 55.56% 
35 14 9 64.29% 
36 10 4 40.00% 
37 17 6 35.29% 
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38 31 11 35.48% 
39 9 6 66.67% 
40 22 12 54.55% 
41 8 3 37.50% 
42 25 13 52.00% 
43 13 5 38.46% 
44 15 7 46.67% 
45 28 9 32.14% 
46 5 3 60.00% 
47 24 11 45.83% 
48 11 6 54.55% 
49 6 
50 18 6' 33.33% 
51 19 9 47.37% 
52 9 3 33.33% 
53 13 12 92.31% 
54 4 3 75.00% 
55 18 8 44.44% 
56 10 5 50.00% 
57 8 5 62.50% 
58 10 6 60.00% 
59 5 2 40.00% 
60 6 2 33.33% 
61 5 
62 3 2 66.67% 
63 5 2 40.00% 
64 6 5 83.33% 
65 11 1 9.09% 
66 5 3 60.00% 
67 8 5 62.50% 
68 7 
69 2 
981 427 43.53% 
~* Start date was 05/28/2008 
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TABLE 3: POST Offender Felony Case Accountability Before POST Start Date (n = 357) 
Offender Number Of Guiltll Case Pet 
Number Cases Count Accountabilitv 
1 7 
2 3 
3 11 2 18.18% 
4 9 5 55.56% 
5 8 3 37.50% 
6 3 3 100.00% 
7 4 2 50.00% 
8 
9 4 4 100.00% 
10 11 8 72.73% 
11 26 1 3.85% 
12 5 1 20.00% 
13 22 18 81.82% 
14 
15 3 2 66.67% 
16 6 2 33.33% 
17 
18 13 5 38.46% 
19 7 1 14.29% 
20 13 3 23.08% 
21 13 11 84.62% 
22 5 4 80.00% 
23 3 
24 7 4 57.14% 
25 11 6 54.55% 
26 7 1 14.29% 
27 7 5 71.43% 
28 1 1 100.00% 
29 3 1 33.33% 
30 4 2 50.00% 
31 3 
32 3 2 66.67% 
33 15 11 73.33% 
34 2 1 50.00% 
35 
36 2 2 100.00% 
37 6 1 16.67% 
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38 9 5 55.56% 
39 14 4 28.57% 
40 18 
41 5 1 20.00% 
42 6 2 33.33% 
43 3 
44 
45 8 3 37.50% 
46 6 4 66.67% 
47 12 6 50.00% 
48 16 8 50.00% 
49 4 3 75.00% 
50 
51 12 2 16.67% 
52 9 6 66.67% 
53 7 2 28.57% 
54 8 5 62.50% • 
55 
56 7 
57 2 
58 
59 12 1 8.33% 
60 8 4 50.00% 
61 5 1 20.00% 
62 6 2 33.33% 
63 19 11 57.89% 
64 1 
65 
66 14 8 57.14% 
67 9 4 44.44% 
68 3 2 66.67% 
69 11 6 54.55% 
70 8 
71 4 1 25.00% 
72 6 2 33.33% 
73 25 13 52.00% 
74 5 2 40.00% 
75 3 1 33.33% 
76 10 5 50.00% 
77 30 8 26.67% 
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78 
79 7 5 71.43% 
80 7 1 14.29% 
81 2 1 50.00% 
82 2 
83 
84 9 3 33.33% 
85 4 1 . 25.00% 
86 8 5 62.50% 
87 
88 4 2 50.00% 
89 8 2 25.00% 
90 3 
91 
92 8 
93 16 3 18.75% 
94 2 
95 10 6 60.00% 
96 4 
97 6 
98 1 1 100.00% 
99 4 1 25.00% 
100 15 8 53.33% 
101 18 10 55.56% 
102 4 4 100.00% 
103 11 8 72.73% 
104 26 4 15.38% 
105 5 3 60.00% 
106 4 2 50.00% 
107 10 4 40.00% 
108 12 4 33.33% 
109 21 6 28.57% 
110 5 3 60.00% 
111 19 5 26.32% 
112 11 4 36.36% 
113 4 
114 
115 6 3 50.00% 
116 3 1 33.33% 
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117 19 8 42.11% 
118 13 6 46.15% 
119 
120 4 1 25.00% 
121 1 
122 7 3 42.86% 
123 11 2 18.18% 
124 16 5 31.25% 
125 10 2 20.00% 
126 7 4 57.14% 
127 18 2 11.11% 
128 2 
129 
130 6 2 33.33% 
131 
132 11 
133 16 11 68.75% 
134 12 7 58.33% 
135 2 1 50.00% 
136 
137 
138 
139 9 2 22.22% 
140 14 1 7.14% 
141 1 
142 10 8 80.00% 
143 
144 14 8 57.14% 
145 16 1 6.25% 
146 12 2 16.67% 
147 7 3 42.86% 
148 15 5 33.33% 
149 26 11 42.31% 
150 18 7 38.89% 
151 3 3 100.00% 
152 6 3 50.00% 
153 8 4 50.00% 
154 9 8 88.89% 
155 4 2 50.00% 
156 
157 2 
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158 11 7 63.64% 
159 9 1 11.11% 
160 10 3 30.00% 
161 
162 11 5 45.45% 
163 10 5 50.00% 
164 5 
165 6 4 66.67% 
166 7 2 28.57% 
167 8 7 87.50% 
168 23 7 30.43% 
169 8 5 62.50% 
170 
171 5 1 20.00% 
172 10 5 50.00% 
173 15 3 20.00% 
174 6 
175 9 1 11.11% 
176 8 5 62.50% 
177 4 
178 11 3 27.27% 
179 2 
180 10 7 70.00% 
181 9 4 44.44% 
182 3 3 100.00% 
183 3 2 66.67% 
184 
185 5 4 80.00% 
186 
187 5 1 20.00% 
188 8 3 37.50% 
189 5 2 40.00% 
190 7 7 100.00% 
191 2 
192 6 
193 
194 
195 4 3 75.00% 
196 14 4 28.57% 
197 6 1 16.67% 
198 13 5 38.46% 
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199 4 2 50.00% 
200 2 2 100.00% 
201 5 2 40.00% 
202 13 5 38.46% 
203 
204 5 1 20.00% 
205 2 
206 6 3 50.00% 
207 11 7 63.64% 
208 3 1 33.33% 
209 3 1 33.33% 
210 6 1 16.67% 
211 7 2 28.57% 
212 5 1 20.00% 
213 7 3 42.86% 
214 
215 3 
216 11 1 9.09% 
217 5 1 20.00% 
218 4 2 50.00% 
219 13 9 69.23% 
220 4 1 25.00% 
221 9 
222 13 5 38.46% 
223 3 1 33.33% 
224 3 1 33.33% 
225 8 2 25.00% 
226 6 2 33.33% 
227 6 2 33.33% 
228 1 
229 6 3 50.00% 
230 4 
231 7 3 42.86% 
232 10 6 60.00% 
233 4 1 25.00% 
234 6 3 50.00% 
235 1 
236 10 3 30.00% 
237 4 2 50.00% 
238 4 2 50.00% 
239 4 1 25.00% 
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240 5 4 80.00% 
241 5 2 40.00% 
242 2 2 100.00% 
243 5 1 20.00% 
244 14 3 21.43% 
245 4 2 50.00% 
246 2 1 50.00% 
247 12 4 33.33% 
248 1 
249 9 2 22.22% 
250 2 1 50.00% 
251 
252 9 7 77.78% 
253 
254 8 
255 1 1 100.00% 
256 3 1 33.33% 
257 3 2 66.67% 
258 5 2 40.00% 
259 5 3 60.00% 
260 1 1 100.00% 
261 2 2 100.00% 
262 7 6 85.71% 
263 10 7 70.00% 
264 9 
265 3 2 66.67% 
266 6 
267 6 2 33.33% 
268 
269 6 3 50.00% 
270 3 1 33.33% 
271 2 1 50.00% 
272 9 
273 1 
274 1 
275 
276 3 2 66.67% 
277 3 
278 2 
279 
280 4 2 50.00% 
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281 
282 1 1 100.00% 
283 
284 3 
285 1 
286 
287 
288 
289 3 1 33.33% 
290 1 
291 1 
292 
293 1 
294 2 
295 
296 
297 
298 1 
299 1 
300 
301 1 
302 
303 1 
304 
305 
306 
307 
308 
309 
310 
311 
312 
313 
314 
315 
316 
317 
318 
319 
320 
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321 
322 
323 
324 
325 
326 
327 
328 
329 8 
330 
331 
332 
333 
334 
335 
336 
337 
338 
339 
340 
341 
342 
343 
344 
345 
346 
347 
348 
349 
350 
351 
352 
353 
354 
355 
356 
357 
1884 717 38.06% 
PRIORITIZING OFFENDERS 94 
TABLE 4: Pre-POST and Post-POST Suspect Incidents (n = 166) 
Offender Pre-POST Post-POST 
Number Incidents Incidents 
1 1 0 
2 8 0 
3 3 1 
4 2 0 
5 7 0 
6 4 1 
7 3 1 
8 3 0 
9 1 1 
10 1 0 
11 1 0 
12 1 1 
13 2 1 
14 7 1 
15 3 1 
16 2 0 
17 0 1 
18 5 3 
19 1 0 
20 2 2 
21 2 13 
22 2 0 
23 0 2 
24 1 2 
25 3 3 
26 11 0 
27 2 0 
28 11 1 
29 5 1 
30 2 1 
31 1 0 
32 8 0 
33 1 1 
34 3 0 
35 5 1 
36 1 0 
37 5 0 
38 3 1 
39 0 1 
40 1 1 
41 2 0 
42 2 0 
43 1 0 
44 1 4 
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45 11 0 
46 1 0 
47 5 3 
48 4 0 
49 0 1 
50 2 2 
51 13 0 
52 2 0 
53 2 1 
54 1 0 
55 1 0 
56 1 1 
57 0 1 
58 2 0 
59 2 0 
60 1 1 
61 3 1 
62 8 1 
63 2 0 
64 2 1 
65 3 0 
66 2 0 
67 2 1 
68 1 0 
69 6 3 
70 1 0 
71 2 0 
72 1 1 
73 1 1 
74 13 0 
75 1 0 
76 1 2 
77 1 1 
78 1 0 
79 0 1 
80 3 2 
81 4 0 
82 8 1 
83 1 0 
84 5 1 
85 1 0 
86 4 0 
87 1 0 
88 2 0 
89 2 0 
90 4 0 
91 3 1 
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92 3 0 
93 4 1 
94 0 1 
95 3 0 
96 6 1 
97 6 3 
98 1 1 
99 1 2 
100 0 1 
101 11 0 
102 2 0 
103 1 1 
104 2 0 
105 4 4 
106 3 0 
107 2 0 
108 3 2 
109 6 1 
110 1 0 
111 2 1 
112 1 3 
113 4 0 
114 2 1 
115 1 0 
116 3 0 
117 4 0 
118 4 0 
119 4 1 
120 4 2 
121 5 1 
122 1 0 
123 1 1 
124 2 2 
125 1 2 
126 1 0 
127 2 0 
128 0 1 
129 1 0 
130 0 4 
131 5 0 
132 3 0 
133 10 1 
134 2 0 
135 0 1 
136 5 0 
137 1 0 
138 3 0 
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139 3 0 
140 3 1 
141 4 1 
142 3 0 
143 6 0 
144 4 0 
145 3 4 
146 2 5 
147 5 2 
148 2 1 
149 2 0 
150 1 0 
151 15 1 
152 1 0 
153 1 0 
154 2 1 
155 8 0 
156 4 1 
157 21 3 
158 1 1 
159 4 0 
160 1 1 
161 2 0 
162 2 0 
163 1 3 
164 1 0 
165 1 0 
166 2 0 
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TABLE 5: Pre-POST and Post-POST Paired T-Test (n = 166) 
Group Pre-POST Post-POST 
Mean 3.03 0.83 
SD 3.08 1.39 
SEM 0.24 0.11 
.. '* p <0.0001 
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TABLE 6: Charlotte 2009-2010 Pmi I Crime Rates (CMPD, 2011) 
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TABLE?: Reported Part I Incidents in Charlotte 2008-2010 (CMPD, 2011) 
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TABLE 8: Weighted Values for POST Nominations (CMPD, 2011) 
Factor Weighted Value 
Progression 10 
Felony Convictions 9 
Felony Charges 7 
Listed as Suspect 5 
. Contact Decay 5 
Raid and Search 4 
Misdemeanor Charge 3 
Field Interview 1 
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TABLE 9: Reported Part I Incidents in Charlotte 1999-2009 (www.city-
data.com/city/Charlotte-North-Carolina.html) 
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Appendix E: Figures 
Accountability 
0~~>~~ Pre-POST 
POST 
Control 
Accountability 
FIGURE 1: Accountability of Pre-POST, POST and Control Offenders 
Iii Accountability 
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Influence of POST on Recidivism 
Pre-POST# of Incidents 
(Mean) 
Post-POST# of Incidents 
(Mean) 
111 Pre-POST# of Incidents (Mean) 
11 Post-POST# of Incidents (Mean) 
FIGURE 2: Pre-POST and Post-POST Number ofincidents 
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Clearance Rate 
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FIGURE 3: CMPD clearance rates 2007- August 2011 
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1!\1 Charlotte burglanes D U.S. a1~rage burglaries I 
FIGURE 4: Charlotte Burglaries Compared to US Average 1999-2009 (www.city-
data.com/city/Charlotte-North-Carolina.html 
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SARA Model 
Planned Change 
Analyze the Problem 
Scan Assess l ~ 
Goals & Objectives Revise/Reassess 
l l 
Design the Police/Program Evaluation 
l r 
Analyze _ ____.,.,. Respond Action plan Implementation 
FIGURE 5: Examples of Processes for Planned Change Implementation 
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